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Federal preemption is perhaps the most important public law issue
of the day. The stakes in preemption cases are enormous, as pre-
emption determines whether the federal government or the states
control regulatory policy in a host of politically controversial con-
texts. Congress clearly has primary constitutional authority in
setting federal preemption policy, but, for numerous political and
practical reasons, cannot be solely responsible for its implementation.
Determining which organ of the federal government is best at
implementing preemption policy has therefore become the central
preoccupation of the academic literature. While this comparative
institutional analysis is certainly important in allocating preemption
policy-making business, it has elided a very important issue:
Congress has an interest not only in what substantive preemption
policy should be, but also in who should be primarily responsible for
implementing it. In other words, there is a strategic delegation choice
to be made by Congress for which current institutional choice
approaches to preemption do not fully account.
This Article addresses the delegation issue by providing a
framework for how Congress should be “legislating preemption.” It
identifies two previously overlooked challenges posed by delegating
preemption implementation responsibility to the federal courts
instead of to federal agencies. First, Congress has only weak policing
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tools when it delegates to federal courts, and therefore has little
opportunity to correct the judiciary when it strays from Congress’s
preemption policy preferences. Second, in its preemption jurispru-
dence, the Supreme Court has adopted what this Article terms a
Centralization Default, which leads it to generally disfavor anti-
preemption arguments when Congress does not provide clear
instructions to the contrary. The Article then proposes that Congress
respond to these challenges by drafting broad standards and creating
favorable legislative history when preemption policy coincides with
the Centralization Default. By contrast, Congress should draft clear
rules when it wants to overcome the Centralization Default. After
developing the “legislating preemption” framework, the Article uses
the Dodd-Frank Act’s national bank preemption provisions to
illustrate what happens when Congress does not apply the frame-
work. As the Article shows, Congress’s failure to account for its weak
post-delegation policing tools or the Centralization Default will likely
lead to more federal preemption than Congress intended.
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INTRODUCTION
Once an arcane backwater of constitutional jurisprudence loved
almost exclusively by law professors, preemption has become the
focus of the country’s most contentious political issues. From
immigration to gay marriage, from tort reform to financial reform,
the propriety of displacing state law with federal law is quite
possibly the most important public law question of the day. When
framed in more practical terms, the enormity of the stakes in
preemption cases becomes unmistakably clear: preemption deter-
mines which level of government—federal or state—gets to control
regulatory policy in a complex federal system.  It should therefore1
come as no surprise that the Supreme Court has significantly
increased its involvement in preemption issues over the past twenty
years. Indeed, the Court docketed five preemption cases for the
2010-2011 Term alone.2
Despite this new interest in preemption, little attention has been
given to a persistent and fundamental puzzle that it presents:
how horizontal allocations of governmental power—as between
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the administrative state—affect
vertical distributions of governmental power—as between the
federal government and the governments of the several states. In
other words, how does assigning preemption decision making to one
federal body or another make it more or less likely that federal law
will trump state law? In other areas dealing with allocations of
federal and state power, such as those implicating the dormant
1. See Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Federal Preemption: Principles and
Politics, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, June 2007, at 1, 1-2, 6, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080228_
EpsteinGreve.pdf.
2. The Court consolidated three generic drug labeling cases. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593
F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 817 (2010); Mensing v. W yeth, Inc., 588 F.3d
603 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Actavis Elizabeth, LLC v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 817
(2010); Mensing v. W yeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 817 (2010). Four additional preemption cases were on the Court’s
docket for the 2010-2011 Term. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010); Bruesewitz
v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010); Chicanos Por
La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Chamber
of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010); W illiamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.,
84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3348 (2010).
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Commerce Clause and abstention, courts and commentators assume
with little discussion that the federal judiciary is ultimately
responsible for making difficult federalism choices. As this Article
demonstrates, however, preemption is different. While it is rou-
tinely acknowledged that the Constitution invests Congress with
the  authority to set preemption policy, the oddity and implica-
tions of Congress’s power over such an important aspect of “Our
Federalism”  is routinely overlooked.3
Until recently, such an oversight was perhaps understandable.
Historically, Congress has done little to second guess the Court’s
preemption decisions.  Whether because of apathy, mistake, or the4
inability to build majority coalitions, Congress has left the final
decision-making authority for preemption issues largely in the
hands of the federal courts.  The Court has, in turn, proven5
increasingly sympathetic to claims of preemption in recent years,6
thereby allowing defendants otherwise subject to suit under state
law to escape liability. This has shaken Congress out of its typical
disengagement with preemption matters. In response to several
of the Court’s recent preemption decisions, Congress has entered
the preemption fray with uncharacteristic vigor.  Most notably,7
President Obama recently signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).8
3. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
4. According to one recent study, Congress explicitly and fully overrode only 2 out of 127
preemption decisions issued by the Court between the Court’s 1983 and 2003 Terms. See
Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of
Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604,
1612-13 (2007). But cf. Dodd-Frank W all Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
(implicitly overruling the Supreme Court’s holding in W atters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550
U.S. 1 (2006), that state mortgage lending laws do not apply to state-chartered affiliates and
subsidiaries of national banks).
5. See generally Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (A) Faithful Agency in the Supreme Court’s
Preemption Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 367 (2011) (scrutinizing the Supreme
Court’s control over the formulation of preemption policy).
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. For example, in 2009, eighteen members of the United States Senate sponsored the
Medical Device Safety Act of 2009. S. 549, 111th Cong. (2009). The purpose of the bill was to
“correct the Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, which misconstrued the intent
of Congress and cut off access to our Nation’s courts for citizens injured or killed by defective
medical devices.” 155 CONG. REC. S1861 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
8. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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Among other things, this sweeping legislation attempts to reverse
the twenty-year expansion of federal preemption in the area of
national banking and federal thrift regulation.9
The question that this Article addresses, and one that has thus
far received no significant attention in the literature, is how
Congress can best achieve its federal preemption policy-making
goals. If Congress has any interest in what its substantive preemp-
tion policies should be, it must also be interested in who is primarily
responsible for implementing those policies. Given that preemption
involves a host of detailed, context-specific, and often unanticipated
policy judgments, Congress has no choice but to delegate some
responsibility for its development and management to other govern-
mental departments.  More specifically, Congress must make a10
strategic choice to select the Court,  administrative agencies, or11
some combination of the two to fill out the details of its preemption
preferences. Determining how to make this choice is not straightfor-
ward. Recent institutional choice approaches to preemption have
analyzed and compared the institutional competencies of Congress,
the Court, and administrative agencies. Such analyses have sug-
gested, for example, that the Court is better suited to make some
preemption policy because it is better equipped to answer constitu-
tional federalism questions.  They have also suggested that agen-12
cies may be preferable because of their greater familiarity with the
statutes they enforce, their superior understanding of the industries
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See Thomas W . Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727,
754 (2008); Sharpe, supra note 5, at 369.
11. See infra Part I.C.1. This Article assumes that congressional delegation of preemption
policy to courts falls primarily to federal courts and, within the federal judiciary, the Supreme
Court controls that delegation. It should be noted, however, that state courts must also
answer preem ption questions within their jurisdiction. Moreover, there is reason to believe
that approaches to preem ption taken by state courts may differ from those taken by their
federal counterparts. See Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive
Theory, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 244, 247 (2008) (conducting empirical study on a data set
of 300 state court products liability preemption decisions and concluding that “federal courts
are considerably more likely to find preemption than are state courts”); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus
Federal Court, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1021-46 (2007) (asserting that state courts are more
likely than federal courts to reject expansive preemption arguments, whereas federal courts
are more likely than state courts to defer to agency preemption arguments).
12. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 757; Sharpe, supra note 5, at 434.
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they regulate, or their greater analytical sophistication.  What13
these approaches hold in common is their assumption that Congress
has “punted” the preemption issue to courts or to agencies, and
hence the analysis of preemption should begin with the capacities
of courts and agencies to resolve preemption problems. 
While comparative institutional advantage is certainly an im-
portant factor in allocating preemption policy-making business, it
cannot be the only factor. But it is here that the typical institutional
choice approach elides something very important: Congress has an
interest not only in what substantive preemption policy should be,
but also in who should be primarily responsible for implementing
that policy. In other words, there is a delegation choice to be made
by Congress for which the literature does not fully account, and this
choice is informed by distinctly congressional interests. 
In making the delegation choice, Congress depends a great deal
on its ability to monitor and influence judicial and agency imple-
mentations of its preemption policies. Such monitoring helps
Congress to maximize policy conformance and to minimize policy
drift. Generally speaking, Congress has access to an array of formal
and informal mechanisms to police delegations of policy-making
authority to administrative agencies. Through committee hearings,
promised budget appropriations and threatened cuts, letters, and
phone calls, members of Congress have numerous means by which
to guide agency decision making after enacting legislation.14
13. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 755; Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. W ASH. L. REV. 449, 485-86 (2008); Sharpe,
supra note 5, at 428-29.
14. See LEWIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE
(4th ed. 1998). To be clear, it is not the goal of this Article to explore the effectiveness of
Congress's agency monitoring tools relative to the President or to the nongovernmental
constituencies that agencies are often thought to serve. Accordingly, this Article does not
debate the effectiveness of congressional monitoring in the face of contradictory interest group
pressures placed on agencies. In any event, capture by regulated industries is certainly a
concern when delegating policy implementation authority to administrative agencies, though
the actual extent of this problem is debatable. Compare Thomas W . Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983 , 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1997) (observing that agency
capture and its centrality is the “pathology of agency government”), with David B. Spence, The
Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in
Environmental Law , 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 961 (2001) (“The most important defect of capture
theory is that it is unsupported by the evidence.”), and Matthew C. Stephenson, Public
Regulation of Private Enforcem ent: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative
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However, the policing mechanisms Congress uses to rein in agency
policymaking are mostly inapplicable to the federal judiciary.  In15
fact, when dealing with courts, Congress is generally limited to two
such mechanisms—the creation of legislative history and the threat
of legislative override—neither of which is effective in most
situations.  As a result, Congress can assert little post-enactment16
control when it delegates policy-making power to federal courts.
Nevertheless, the federal courts are frequently left to implement
Congress’s preemption policies. Whether Congress specifies those
policies in statutory text or leaves such details for future delinea-
tion,  it stands to reason that it will want to at least consider17
whether it can monitor and influence how the Supreme Court
interprets and implements congressional policies. Judicial interpre-
tation and implementation could otherwise result in outcomes that
Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 130-32 (2005) (arguing that fears of agency capture are often
exaggerated). Nor does this Article attempt to compare Congress’s influence over agencies,
independent or dependent, to that of the President. Cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (analyzing congressional and presidential
control over administrative policy making).
Rather, my assertion is that Congress has more effective means of correcting agency policy
drift than judicial policy drift. Accordingly, I am sympathetic to arguments made by advocates
of “congressional dominance theory” asserting that Congress can effectively control
delegations to administrative agencies through ex post controls. See Barry R. W eingast &
Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking
by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 780 (1983). For an excellent summary
of the congressional dominance theory literature, see J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The
Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1457-59 (2003).
15. Congress may nevertheless have reasons for choosing courts over agencies. For
example, Congress may feel pressured to punish “rogue agencies” that stray from the policies
preferred by Congress or the public. One way to mete out punishment is to subject agencies
to greater judicial scrutiny. Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. W right, The Future of the
Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577,
584-85 (2011). Congress may also delegate to courts when looking to insulate their policy
choices from interference by future Presidents. The operating assumption would be that
agencies, unless independent, are more susceptible to presidential influence than are federal
courts.
16. See infra Part I.C.2.
17. See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal
Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467, 480 (2008) (“Rules and standards may both generate
uncertainty. Standards are legal norms whose interpretation is provided only ex post by the
courts. Standards, therefore, produce future uncertainty resulting from the indeterminacy of
the interpretation given to them  ex post by the courts. Rules are concrete norms that leave
no (or little) discretion to decision makers.”).
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Congress never intended, or actively sought to avoid, leaving
Congress with few options for correcting the judiciary’s “mistakes.”18
To maintain maximum possible control over how the Court
interprets and implements its statutes, Congress must be respon-
sive to two factors when drafting potentially preemptive legislation.
The first is the Court’s preferred method of statutory interpretation,
which indicates the sources of evidence on which the Court will rely
when interpreting congressional legislation.  Under a purposivist19
interpretive approach, the justices may rely on legislative history as
evidence of Congress’s legislative purposes. Congress exercises
tremendous control over legislative history, so judicial reliance on
it shifts control of statutory interpretation away from the Court and
toward Congress.  Assuming that it is easier for members of20
Congress to express their policy preferences in legislative history
than it is for them to reach agreement on specific statutory lan-
guage, they can adopt broad, vague, or ambiguous language in the
hope that the Court will refer to a statute’s legislative history for
clarification and guidance. Under a textualist interpretive approach,
by contrast, the Justices look to the plain meaning of the legislative
18. W illiam N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991) (concluding after empirical study that Congress
overrides the Supreme Court’s statutory decisions an average of ten times per year); Charles
R. Shipan, Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and the Origins of Broadcast Regulation, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 555 (1997) (“[I]t can be difficult to overturn court decisions. Even if
majorities in both houses want to overturn a court decision, they may be blocked by
institutional features of Congress. Deference to the courts and congressional inattentiveness
also decrease the likelihood that Congress will overturn a court decision.”). 
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra notes 157-81 and accom panying text. Contrary to the views sometimes
expressed by proponents of textualist methods of statutory interpretation, I assume here that
judicial reliance on legislative history is constitutional. Compare Stephen J. Breyer, On the
Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 862-64 (1992)
(arguing that judicial use of legislative history does not violate the constitutional
requirements of bicameralism and presentment in Article I, Section 7, or Article I, Section 1’s
“vesting” of legislative power in Congress), with John Manning, Textualism as Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 673-76, 684-719, 738-39 (1997) (arguing that judicial reliance
on legislative history violates the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment by allowing members of Congress to resolve statutory ambiguities after
enactment). I also assume that legislative history is produced by representative subgroups
of Congress that can, with varying degrees of legitimacy, speak on behalf of the body as a
whole. See W illiam  N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365,
382-83 (1990) (describing theory of legislative intent under which Congress implicitly and
legitimately delegates clarification of ambiguous statutes to committees and sponsors).
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text and disregard legislative history. Settling on precise statutory
text may become much more important in this context, because
textualism allows Congress fewer opportunities to use legislative
history to influence statutory interpretation after legislation is
enacted.  In either case, where the Court looks for evidence of21
statutory meaning should play an important role in how Congress
drafts its legislative text.
The second factor Congress must consider is the Supreme Court’s
predisposition toward or against preemption. The Court has adopted
what this Article terms a “Centralization Default” in its preemption
cases,  which leads the Court to find that state law is preempted in22
the absence of clear and contrary instructions from Congress.23
Recognition of the Default is critical because Congress must know
whether it is working with or against judicial preemption policy
preferences when drafting legislation. Coupled with the first factor
relating to interpretive methods, the Centralization Default reveals
how Congress can reduce preemption policy drift. Assuming, for
instance, that Congress wants to reduce federal preemption in a
given regulatory arena, it would be unwise to pass legislation in the
form of a broad standard. Doing so would give the Court wide
latitude in interpreting Congress’s intent, because Congress would
have declined to provide specific statutory instructions in the legis-
lative text. Although it is possible that the Court would refer to
legislative history to flesh out the details of the legislation, there is
no guarantee that it would do so.  Given the Centralization Default,24
there is a substantial likelihood that the Court would interpret the
legislation in a way that promotes preemption. Thus, the ultimate
preemption policy outcome would be the opposite of what Congress
intended. To reduce the likelihood that the Court will stray from
congressional preemption policy preferences, Congress must there-
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. Here, this Article uses the term “default” in a manner similar to Professor Merrill’s
use of the term “default rule”: “[A] legal presumption ... about the preem ptive effect of a
federal statute in the absence of a discernable intention of Congress directing a different
result.” Thomas W . M errill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism
Theory, and Default Rules, in  FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS
166, 168 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. See infra Part II.A.
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fore account for both the Court’s interpretive methods and its
Centralization Default when determining the specificity and content
of its preemption statutes.25
In essence, members of Congress must make a choice between
adopting statutory language that invites a purposivist interpretive
approach and relies on legislative history, or adopting statutory
language that is amenable to a textualist interpretive approach. It
is more difficult to agree on detailed bright-line preemption pro-
visions than it is to agree on broader preemption standards, and so
bright-line provisions are likely to be less comprehensive than a
combination of broad standards and legislative history. Accordingly,
this choice necessarily involves a strategic tradeoff: members of
Congress must decide whether settling for “less” in specific bright-
line text, or hoping for “more” in legislative history, will ultimately
provide them with greater control over post-enactment statutory
meaning. This Article’s analysis of the Centralization Default and
the Court’s approaches to statutory interpretation informs that
choice. Because of the particular challenges that are posed by moni-
toring and influencing judicial implementation of congressional
preemption policy, this Article reaches an institutional choice con-
clusion different from that of several other commentators.  It26
concludes that Congress should be hesitant to delegate preemption
policymaking authority to federal courts unless it has identified and
can account for the Centralization Default. All things being equal,
delegating preemption policy-making responsibility to administra-
tive agencies may be preferable because of the numerous opportuni-
ties Congress has to police agency decision making.27
25. This is not to say that the Centralization Default or the Court’s preferred methods of
statutory interpretation are static, immobile targets. To the contrary, it is perfectly
reasonable to assum e that both may change over time. However, this assumption makes
congressional identification of the Court’s interpretive and federalism assumptions only
slightly more challenging. As indicated below, the Court’s current views on statutory
interpretation and federalism have evolved quite slowly. See infra Part II.B. By contrast,
Congress is more likely to be focused on short-term policy considerations, further reducing the
likelihood that it will be caught off-guard by an abrupt change in the Court’s approaches to
interpretive methods or federalism.
26. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 10, at 759 (“The best solution would seem to be to rely on
courts as the primary institution for resolving preemption controversies.”).
27. See infra Part I.C.2.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Article makes three distinct
contributions. First, it frames the preemption delegation choice
faced by Congress as a strategic one made by its members. In doing
so, the Article demonstrates the importance of congressional
delegation and monitoring, thereby adding a critical step to the
customary institutional choice approach to preemption that focuses
primarily on comparative institutional advantages. 
Second, it demonstrates how the Centralization Default poses
particular challenges to Congress’s control of preemption poli-
cymaking. More specifically, the Article asserts that the Centraliza-
tion Default increases the difficulty with which federal legislators
reach agreement on antipreemption legislation. The Default does
this either by forcing greater textual specificity in antipreemption
legislation,  or by incentivizing copious and persuasive legislative28
history indicating Congress’s preemptive intentions. 
Finally, the Article puts “legislating preemption” in context by
undertaking one of the first comprehensive analyses of the Dodd-
Frank Act’s controversial national bank preemption provisions.
Broadly speaking, these provisions shift preemption policy imple-
mentation away from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and toward the
federal judiciary. This shift may ultimately thwart the Act’s antipre-
emption thrust, because Congress implemented it in a manner that
fails to take account of post-enactment monitoring options and
Centralization Default considerations.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the doctrinal and
political components of preemption policymaking, and how they
should factor into Congress’s decision to delegate preemption
policymaking authority to the Court or to administrative agencies.
Part II analyzes the constraints on Congress’s ability to influence or
control judicial interpretations of statutory language, and the
centrality of congressional monitoring to managing preemption
policy. It then describes the Centralization Default adopted by the
Court and its effects on Congress’s post-enactment monitoring
28. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism , 98 S. CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1293
n.36 (2010) (“[T]he conventional wisdom holds that legislators must expend more political
capital to reach agreement on statutory text.”).
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options. Part III applies the foregoing analysis to the institutional
choices in the Dodd-Frank Act. A brief conclusion follows.
I. CONGRESSIONAL MANAGEMENT OF PREEMPTION
Simply stated, preemption addresses whether, when, and to what
extent Congress displaces state laws and actions with federal law.29
To be sure, there is substantial debate in the scholarly literature
as to which provisions of the Constitution provide the power to
preempt state laws, and which organs of the federal government
are constitutionally invested with that power.  It is by now black30
letter law, however, that the Constitution commits such decisions
to Congress under the Supremacy Clause.  Accordingly, when pre-31
emption issues are framed for judicial resolution, the Supreme
Court has steadfastly maintained that the inquiry is driven by
whether Congress manifested some intent to displace state law with
federal legislation.  As described in the following subsections, the32
fact that congressional intent drives the preemption inquiry has
implications for the shape of preemption doctrine, the likelihood
that Congress will meaningfully and consistently engage preemp-
tion problems, and the challenges it faces when it does decide to
engage them.
A. Doctrinal Considerations
Broadly speaking, Congress can engage preemption problems in
one of two ways that the Court will recognize. First, it can expressly
29. Cf. Merrill, supra note 10, at 731.
30. Compare id. at 733-37 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause provides, but does not
limit, the power to preem pt state law to Congress), with Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature
of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 785 (1994) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper
Clause is the basis for preemption power, and that it is exclusively wielded by Congress).
31. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U .S. 70, 76-77 (2008). More broadly, Professor Clark
has argued that congressional control of federalism issues is constitutionally mandated. See
Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism , 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321,
1330-31 (2001) (asserting that the legislative procedures set forth in the Constitution protect
state prerogatives by limiting Congress’s power).
32. Good, 555 U.S. at 76 (“[I]nquir[ies] into the scope of a statute’s pre-emptive effect [are]
guided by the rule that ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-
emption case.’” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also W yeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009).
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state its preemptive intent in the language of federal statutes that
may overlap or conflict with state laws or actions (express preemp-
tion).  For example, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA)33
specifically forbids states from creating or enforcing cautionary
labeling requirements for hazardous substances that differ in any
way from those established under federal law.  Thus, a plaintiff34
who was burned by ignited vapors emanating from a metal primer
was barred from suing the primer’s manufacturer under state law.35
Permitting state tort claims for failure to warn against the manufac-
turer based on theories of strict product liability, negligence, and
breach of warranty would have impermissibly imposed primer
labeling requirements different from those already established
under the FHSA.36
Second, Congress can imply its intent to preempt state laws or
actions in a variety of ways. It can, for example, enact such perva-
sive and detailed legislation targeting a particular industry or form
of conduct that the Court will infer Congress’s intent to occupy the
entire field of regulation, to the clear exclusion of the states (field
preemption).  Congress can also enact legislation geared toward37
serving interests of such particular federal importance that its
effectuation would only be impeded by state regulatory involvement
(obstacle preemption).  Finally, Congress may enact legislation that38
forbids conduct required under state law, or that requires conduct
forbidden under state law, making compliance with both federal and
state law impossible (conflict preemption).  While the evidence of39
33. E.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling, Extratextual Obstacle Preemption:
Is Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 63, 71
(2010).
34. Milarese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[I]f a hazardous
substance or its packaging is subject to a cautionary labeling requirement under [the FHSA]
designed to protect against a risk of illness or injury associated with the substance, no State
... may establish or continue in effect a cautionary labeling requirement applicable to such
substance or packaging and designed to protect against the same risk of illness or injury
unless such cautionary labeling requirement is identical to the labeling requirement under
[the FHSA].” (quoting Pub. L. No. 89-756, § 4(a), 80 Stat. 1303, 1305 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (b)(1)(A) (2006) (Effect upon Federal and State Law))).
35. Id. at 108-09.
36. Id. at 109.
37. Gade v. Nat’l Solid W astes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
38. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
39. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
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Congress’s intent may vary under each of these approaches, none
involve an explicit statutory instruction by Congress regarding the
primacy of federal or state law.40
Whether Congress’s intent to preempt state law is expressed in
a statute or implied by it, the Court describes its role as being
limited to determining that intent through tools of statutory inter-
pretation.  Presumably, when administrative agencies are tasked41
with promulgating preemption rules, they are also bound by, and
therefore must locate, Congress’s intent. Despite the Court’s insist-
ence to the contrary, however, preemption is not a routine exercise
in statutory interpretation.  Unlike other instances in which courts42
or agencies are asked to determine congressional intent from
statutory text or other sources, preemption necessarily involves
three simultaneous policy considerations. First and foremost are
questions of federalism, which bring to bear the constitutional
sensitivities inherent in the federal-state relationship.  Second,43
corrective justice considerations examine whether the state
remedial laws under which individuals, entities, or interest groups
seek redress for private wrongs will be eliminated to serve some
overriding federal purpose.  Third, regulatory efficiency consider-44
ations compare federally centralized administration with state-
40. See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 33, at 71.
41. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 742.
42. See id. (“The interpretation of a federal statute does not ordinarily entail a judgment
nullifying state law, yet that far-reaching result is precisely what happens when courts apply
preemption doctrine.”).
43. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 373. In this vein, there are at least two forms in which
preemption federalism can take shape. The first is a procedural federalism, which emphasizes
the participation of the states in discussions over whether their laws should be superseded.
See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption,110 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011) (describing the role that state governments and state-based interest groups play in
federal administrative preemption rulem aking). The second is a formalistic federalism, in
which areas of regulation are denominated as federal, local, or common a priori. Cf. Robert
A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 33, 46-47, 51-52 (W illiam W . Buzbee ed., 2009)
(describing the flaws in a conception of federalism that attempts to demarcate immutable and
exclusive spheres of federal and state regulatory authority). See generally EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE
7-10 (2007) (arguing that no definitive conclusions regarding the balance between state and
federal power can reasonably be drawn from the Constitution’s history or text).
44. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 375-76.
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based decentralized administration to determine the appropriate
means by which to effectuate federal regulatory policy.45
Congress has rarely made clear the extent to which any of these
factors have influenced its preemption policy decisions.  Moreover,46
the proper balance with regard to each consideration—whether to
defer to state as opposed to federal enforcement or to provide
greater or lesser state involvement in federal policymaking, whether
to eliminate causes of action for one set of potential plaintiffs but
not for another, or whether to centralize or decentralize particular
regulatory activities—is not susceptible to immutable rules that
clearly differentiate between correct or incorrect resolutions.  The47
three policy considerations are, in this sense, arbitrary; they cannot
be definitively and objectively derived from binding rules of logic or
law.  When the Court or administrative agencies face preemption48
questions, they are therefore left to piece together Congress’s intent
from available evidence or, as is more often the case, fill in the gaps
with their own views on federalism, corrective justice, and regula-
tory efficiency.49
A recent example drawn from the Court’s products liability pre-
emption jurisprudence illustrates the point. In Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., the Court was asked to decide whether Congress intended to
include the standards underlying state common law tort claims in
its definition of “requirements” under the Medical Device Amend-
ments of 1976 (MDA).  Under the MDA’s express preemption50
clause, states are prohibited from imposing medical device design
45. Id. at 376-77.
46. Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?: A Case
Study of the Failure of Textualism , 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 43 (1996) (“Congress often does
not attempt to expressly articulate its intent regarding preemption.”); Sharkey, supra note
13, at 450-51 (observing that Congress frequently shifts policy questions relating to products
liability preemption to courts or adm inistrative agencies). It is conventional wisdom in the
academy that Congress focuses on the core purposes of the legislation it enacts and not on
ancillary consequences such as preemption. See Fisk, supra, at 102-03 (observing that a
preemption clause enacted by Congress can be the product of “last-minute compromise in a
massive piece of new legislation”).
47. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 374.
48. See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing as
“arbitrary” rules promulgated in the absence of clear and rational justifications derived from
the statutes on which they are based).
49. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 362.
50. 552 U.S. 312, 323 (2008).
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requirements that are “different from, or in addition to” the safety
and effectiveness standards set by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA).  Although the MDA’s preemptive scope turns in this51
instance on which state laws, regulations, or decisions constitute
“requirements,” Congress did not define the term anywhere in the
Act.  Moreover, the Court did not accept as definitive the FDA’s52
construal of the term, in effect concluding that Congress had not
delegated that responsibility to the FDA.  Rather, the Court pro-53
ceeded as though Congress implicitly delegated to it the task of
determining when state products liability laws are displaced by the
FDA-promulgated medical device requirements.  As is typical of its54
preemption clauses, Congress provided no express guidance on how
to undertake this delegated task.
A majority of the Justices resorted to the sources of intent
evidence prescribed by textualist interpretive methods, such as
dictionary definitions, a legal treatise, and the MDA’s language.  In55
doing so, the Court concluded that “requirements” did include state
common law and that Congress did in fact intend to preempt the
plaintiff ’s claim.  What is clear from the opinion is that the Court56
did more than simply fill in the definition of “requirement”; it chose
that definition based in large part on its assumptions that Congress
wanted to prioritize regulatory efficiency concerns over corrective
justice concerns and that centralized decision making by the FDA
was the appropriate means of addressing those concerns.57
In a revealing observation, Justice Scalia, writing for the ma-
jority, stated that “excluding common-law duties from the scope of
pre-emption would make little sense” because “[a state] jury ... sees
only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with
its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are not repre-
51. Id. at 316 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (2006)).
52. See id. at 324-25.
53. See id. at 322 (observing that its interpretation of the MDA’s preemption provision is
only “substantially informed” by the FDA’s regulations).
54. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 372 (2010) (noting that an
ambiguous term is tantamount to delegation of authority to courts).
55. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326, 328-30.
56. Id. at 324-25.
57. Id.
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sented in court.”  A federal agency like the FDA, by contrast, “could58
at least be expected to apply cost-benefit analysis.”  As demon-59
strated by Justice Stevens in his concurrence and by Justice
Ginsburg in her dissent, the Court could have easily found that the
MDA did not preempt the plaintiff ’s claim by relying on the MDA’s
legislative history, which the plaintiff argued would have shown
that Congress prioritized corrective justice over regulatory effi-
ciency.  In either case, the Court felt compelled to make this policy60
choice itself because Congress provided no definitive guidance on
which preemption factors were most important in reaching the
agreement that led to the MDA’s enactment.
B. Practical and Political Considerations
For several reasons, Congress either does not or cannot make all
of the decisions needed to seamlessly implement its preemption
policy. From a mechanical rule-making perspective, the foresight
needed to anticipate all of the situations in which preemption
questions might arise, and to determine how to deal with them, is
simply beyond the capabilities of any legislative body; attempts at
creating any such all-encompassing codes are futile.  Even if61
Congress could understand how its legislation will affect the laws
of all fifty states, those states are well within their rights to change
their laws at any time.  Further, Congress’s administrative re-62
sources are limited; it cannot identify and respond to all of the
58. Id. at 325.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 335-37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even
though Justice Stevens concluded in Riegel that common law tort claims constitute
“requirements” under the MDA, he seemed to do so despite his previously expressed view of
the matter. Id. at 331-33 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the predecessor
case to Riegel, Justice Stevens characterized the notion that the MDA proscribed all state tort
claims against medical device manufacturers as both “unpersuasive” and “implausible.” 518
U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (plurality opinion). However, only four justices signed on to that part of
the opinion. Id. at 487-91.
61. See Fisk, supra note 46, at 102 (“Congress simply cannot anticipate all preemption
problems when it enacts a far-reaching law that displaces a substantial amount of state
law.”).
62. See id. at 100 (discussing how Hawaii amended its Health Care Act despite having
received an express preemption exemption from Congress).
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changes that may occur in the areas it has chosen to regulate.63
Other plausible pitfalls include time pressures, legitimate drafting
challenges, mistakes, and incompetence.  Procedurally, the distri-64
bution of agenda-setting authority among various committees and
party leaders within and outside of Congress can effectively thwart
attempts to override judicial decisions, even when a majority of
members would favor such actions.65
From a purely political perspective, legislators are apt to delegate
to courts or agencies those policy decisions that garner them the
least in electoral gains.  Ambiguity or silence in legislative66
language may therefore be purposeful, as legislative coalitions,
unable to agree on all aspects of a particular proposal, may choose
instead to omit or to muddle disputed features, and thereby leave
their settlement to another day.  Similarly, ambiguous statutory67
language may be the shrewd legislator’s response to competing
interest group pressures; leaving a disputed policy choice unresolved
may enable the legislator to shift the political costs of decision to
the courts or to an administrative agency that will ultimately be
charged with resolving it.  Moreover, it is possible that legislators68
will delegate the implementation of policies they fully expect to fail.
Doing so grants them two electoral benefits. They gain the first by
enacting legislation that is seemingly responsive to the concerns of
the constituencies they are trying to please.  They gain the second69
63. See generally RANDALL B. RIPLEY &  GRACE A. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE
BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12 (W adsworth, Inc., 5th ed. 1991) (observing that the size
and complexity of federal regulation prevents Congress from implementing it on its own).
64. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Advantage, 12 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 217, 220 (1992).
65. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109,
112 n.5 (2010) (“A bill must compete for space and priority on the congressional agenda. It
must navigate numerous ‘vetogates,’ including committee votes, the threat of Senate
filibuster, and the threat of presidential veto. Passage through each of these points requires
both strategic choice and comprom ise.”); Brian A. Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence of
Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell 5-7 (Hoover Inst., W orking Paper No.
P-88-7, 1988), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Marks_A_
Model_of_Judicial_88.pdf.
66. See RIPLEY & FRANKLIN, supra note 63, at 13.
67. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 218.
68. See RIPLEY & FRANKLIN, supra note 63, at 13. It is even possible that administrative
agencies would invite such an outcome. Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 220.
69. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 218.
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when they intervene—through public criticism, constituent service,
or new legislation—to correct the implementation failures of their
delegates.70
The fact that preemption shifts the balance of regulatory power
away from states and toward the federal government can make it
highly unpopular with the voters and elected officials in a con-
gressperson’s or a senator’s home district or state.  In addition,71
federal preemption frequently results in the weakening or the
elimination of state and federal judicial remedies, which rallies
powerful interests that range from consumer advocacy groups to the
plaintiffs’ bar.  At the same time, the business community and72
those that advocate on their behalf are frequently consumers of
federal preemption, which they claim reduces the costs of regulatory
compliance by eliminating the redundancy of simultaneous state
and federal regulation.  Given the difficulties endemic to pleasing73
both pro- and antipreemption interest groups, and presuming that
members of Congress perceive as credible at least some of the
threats of reprisal levied at them by both groups, one would expect
federal legislators to generally avoid expending political capital to
adopt clear and comprehensive preemption legislation.  Even74
assuming that some federal legislators are sufficiently public-
minded to subordinate personal electoral gains to principles such as
corrective justice or constitutional federalism, a minority of self-
interested lawmakers would be sufficient to make enacting those
principles in clear and comprehensive preemption legislation
politically infeasible.  The difficulty of appeasing both pro- and75
70. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE W ASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
48 (1977).
71. Id. To be sure, state-based interest groups can effectively lobby against preemption.
Cf. JAMES I. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 48-49 (2006) (describing
how state and local governments rally federal representatives against the adoption of
administrative agency regulations that would have preemptive effect).
72. See Mark E. Gudnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer
Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 663, 690 (2008); Sharpe, supra note 5, at 375-76 (discussing how the predispositions
of Supreme Court Justices in preemption cases can result in the preservation or elimination
of private rights of action).
73. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2007).
74. Id. at 28.
75. About the Senate Committee System , U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/general/
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antipreemption constituencies will thus increase the likelihood that
Congress will purposely ignore the issue, make vague pronounce-
ments that do not offend competing interest groups, and/or delegate
decision-making responsibility to another branch of government.76
C. Delegation and Monitoring Considerations
1. Limitations on Congress’s Choice of Delegate
Congressional hesitancy in the preemption context can result not
only in vague or ambiguous preemption directives but also in vague
or ambiguous delegations of preemption authority. The problem of
vague delegations in the preemption context has manifested itself
in scholarly debates regarding the scope of Congress’s delegation
authority and in the Supreme Court’s indecision over the level of
deference courts should afford an agency’s preemption determina-
tions. Scholars have questioned whether Congress possesses the
constitutional authority to delegate preemption decisions to admin-
istrative agencies,  and hence whether the only appropriate dele-77
gate for such questions is the judiciary. Others have asserted that,
constitutional issues aside, agencies simply lack the institutional
competence to determine the appropriate balance between state and
common/generic/about_committees.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“Several thousand bills
and resolutions are referred to committees during each 2-year Congress. Com m ittees select
a small percentage for consideration, and those not addressed often receive no further
action.”); see also How Our Laws are Made, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
lawsmade.bysec/considbycomm.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (“A committee may table a
bill or fail to take action on it, thereby preventing its report to the House.”).
76. See Hills, supra note 73, at 28 (noting that preemption can create a vigorous and
public debate, which Congress “would prefer to avoid”).
77. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 n.81
(2000) (“It is not entirely clear whether an agency might be able to decide the [preemption]
question if Congress expressly said that the agency is permitted to do so.”). That being said,
the fecklessness of the Court’s nondelegation doctrine is not likely to pose a threat to
Congress’s preemption delegations. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially
Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 435-36 (2008)
(“Only if Congress empowers an agency to make law without supplying an ‘intelligible
principle’ has Congress crossed the constitutional line by giving away the nondelegable core
of legislative power.”).
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federal power, again making the courts Congress’s only viable
option.78
We see this issue play out in the Court’s struggles with the level
of deference courts should afford agencies when those agencies
interpret statutory language in a way that displaces state law. From
an institutional choice perspective, the deference issue is critical. If
the Court decides that an agency’s preemption decisions are worthy
of only Skidmore deference,  it has effectively concluded that the79
courts are primarily responsible for implementing Congress’s
preemption policies. Although courts must consider an agency’s
views under Skidmore, they are free to reject those views to the
extent they are unpersuasive. By contrast, if the Court accords an
agency’s views Chevron deference,  then it has inferred that80
Congress wanted to make the agency primarily responsible for
determining Congress’s preemptive intent.81
Although the issue is certainly not free from doubt, it appears
from the Supreme Court’s engagement with the deference issue that
it is not yet poised to prevent Congress from delegating preemption
decisions to federal agencies. However, the Court may have already
imposed requirements for how Congress indicates its delegation
choice. In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. and Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the
78. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U.
L. REV. 695, 706-07, 717-18, 722-25 (2008) (arguing that agencies lack the institutional
competence and statutory guidance required to make informed choices on questions of state
autonomy).
79. Under Skidmore deference, “[t]he weight of [an agency’s views] in a particular case
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944). W hile there is disagreement about the precise contours of the Skidmore analysis, it
is clear that “Skidmore allows a reviewing court to be the final arbiter of whether the agency’s
interpretation is persuasive but specifies some factors and allows for the existence of others
that a court should consider in evaluating the agency’s case.” Kristin E. Hickman, The Need
for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1552
(2006).
80. W ILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 285 (3d ed. 2009) (“The
Chevron doctrine has come to be associated with the idea that courts defer to an agency’s
interpretation of law and that this deference is strong deference, allowing agencies
substantial leeway in their interpretations.”).
81. See Lemos, supra note 77, at 429 (“Under Chevron, courts treat ambiguity in an
agency-administered statute as im plicit evidence of Congress’s intention to delegate
lawmaking authority to the agency.”).
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Court suggested that an agency’s preemption determinations should
be accorded Skidmore deference (or at least something less than
Chevron deference).  In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., it ex-82
pressly refused to address the deference question.  In Wyeth v.83
Levine,  Justice Stevens, writing for the five-Justice majority,84 85
noted that the Court has in prior decisions “given ‘some weight’ to
an agency’s views about the impact of tort law on federal objectives
when ‘the subject matter is technical and the relevant history and
background are complex and extensive.’”  From this observation, it86
appears that the Court will default to Skidmore deference to an
agency’s preemption determinations, at least where state common
law is involved, and at least where the agency’s technical core
competencies are implicated. The weight the Court accords “the
agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme
[will accordingly] depend[ ] on its thoroughness, consistency, and
persuasiveness.”  In keeping with this Skidmore default, Justice87
Stevens also preserved the possibility that Congress could expressly
delegate preemption decision-making authority to an administrative
agency. He observed that “agencies have no special authority to
pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress.”88
82. 552 U.S. 312, 326-27 (2008); 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996). The Court’s opinion in Lohr is
particularly curious in this regard. The Court specifically acknowledged conditions that would
seemingly make Chevron deference appropriate: that § 360k of the MDA was ambiguous, that
“Congress ha[d] given the FDA a unique role in determining the scope of § 360k’s pre-emptive
effect,” and that “the [FDA was] uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form
of state law [stood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress ... and therefore whether it should be preempted.” 518 U.S. at 496
(internal quotations omitted). The Court even cited Chevron in its analysis. See id.
Nevertheless, it did not state that it must defer to the FDA’s conclusions regarding § 360k’s
preemptive scope. Rather, it stated that its conclusions are only “substantially informed” by
the FDA’s interpretation of the statute. Id.
83. 550 U.S. 1, 20-21 (2006).
84. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
85. Though he concurred in the Court’s decision, Justice Thomas did not agree with the
Court’s reasoning. See id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately, however,
because I cannot join the majority’s implicit endorsement of far-reaching implied pre-emption
doctrines.”).
86. Id. at 1201 (alteration omitted) (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
883 (2000)).
87. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
88. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (emphasis added).
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It therefore appears that the Court will assume Congress has
delegated preemption decisions to the judiciary and that an agency’s
views on the matter will be informative but not dispositive. As
Professor Metzger has recently observed, it seems that “Wyeth
insist[s] that conclusions of preemptive effect are ultimately for the
courts to make in their independent judgment, at least absent an
express delegation to an agency of preemptive authority.”  While89
Justice Stevens did not explicitly address whether such a delegation
could ever be implied from an express preemption clause, the
Court’s decision almost four months later in Cuomo v. Clearing
House Ass’n left open that possibility.  There, the Court flirted with90
applying the Chevron framework to the OCC’s interpretation of the
term “visitorial powers” without fully committing to it, fully re-
jecting it, or explicitly engaging in a “Chevron Step Zero” analysis.91
Although the Court in Cuomo had to construe the National Bank
Act’s (NBA) express preemption provision, it declined to indicate
whether Congress had delegated preemption authority to the OCC
through that provision. It may be that the difference between the
Court’s flirtation with Chevron deference in Cuomo and its seeming
rejection of it in Wyeth can be explained by Congress’s inclusion of
an express preemption clause in the NBA and its exclusion of such
a clause in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  If that is the case,92
however, it is puzzling that the Court referred to the Chevron
framework in neither Lohr nor Riegel, both of which involved the
89. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform , 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15
(2011).
90. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
91. Id. at 2715; see M etzger, supra note 89, at 16 (“[T]the majority opinion [in Cuomo]
deviates from ordinary Chevron review by refusing to defer to the OCC's regulation
interpreting ‘visitorial powers’ in the NBA, despite acknowledging that this term was
ambiguous and the regulation had been promulgated using full notice-and-comment
procedures.”). The Court ultimately rejected the OCC’s interpretation as unreasonable. See
Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2724 (Thomas, J., concurring). One could argue that the Court did not
consider Chevron deference a viable option, given the fuzziness of its analysis and its implicit
refusal to dismiss Chevron analysis as the appropriate framework for answering the deference
question. See Sharkey, supra note 33, at 106 & n.230 (asserting that the Court did not move
beyond Chevron Step One, and hence did not grant the OCC Chevron deference, because it
resolved the “visitorial powers” question on the plain terms of the NBA).
92. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196 (observing that Congress “declined to enact” an express
preemption provision applicable to prescription drug regulation).
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application of the MDA’s express preemption clause.  Nevertheless,93
it would seem that the Court will certainly recognize express con-
gressional delegations of preemption authority—and hence apply
Chevron analysis—when a statute specifically invests a federal
agency with that authority. Otherwise, the Court will likely assume
that Congress intended the judiciary to be its primary preemption
delegate.
2. The Importance of Congressional Monitoring
Assuming that congressional delegation of some preemption
policymaking is all but inevitable, and assuming that there are few,
if any, constitutional constraints on Congress’s choice of delegate,
the question becomes how Congress should choose its delegate.
Scholars most often answer this question by analyzing the strengths
and weaknesses of the two primary institutional candidates: the
federal courts, usually the Supreme Court, and federal agencies. For
example, Professor Merrill has proffered what is essentially a two-
step analysis for the closely related issue of whether Congress, the
Court, or an agency is best suited to manage preemption issues. He
first identifies preemption’s core considerations from an institu-
tional choice perspective, which in his view include “constitutional,
interpretational, and pragmatic variables.”  He then assesses the94
comparative advantages and disadvantages of Congress, the courts,
and agencies in dealing with each variable.  Similarly, Professor95
Sharkey has argued that questions of institutional choice in the
products liability preemption context should be answered by courts,
plied with empirical data from expert federal agencies like the
FDA.  Other commentators have employed similar analyses that96
focus on whether different branches of the federal government are
institutionally competent to make substantive preemption policy
choices,  though their conclusions vary.97
93. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 482 (1996).
94. Merrill, supra note 10, at 730.
95. Id. at 744-59.
96. Sharkey, supra note 13, at 485-91.
97. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1948
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To be sure, these thoughtful analyses highlight a critical compo-
nent of preemption policy management: an unreasonable expecta-
tion of an institution’s decisional capacities could thwart the
effective implementation of any policy, preemption policy included.98
Along these lines, I have described elsewhere how “institutional
singularity” has dominated the Supreme Court’s preemption juris-
prudence. Although the Court’s decisions rhetorically assume that
Congress is solely responsible for controlling the shape of federal
preemption policy, in practice the Court itself attempts to exercise
such control.  In either case, the Court’s operative assumption is99
that a single branch of the federal government can effectively
manage the confluence of policy issues that preemption routinely
presents.  Such institutional singularity not only disregards100
Congress’s critical role as federal preemption policy coordinator,101
but it also disregards important strategic factors that members of
Congress likely consider when delegating preemption policy imple-
mentation to the executive and judicial branches.  A critical102
addition to this account is the centrality of Congress’s role in
coordinating and delegating preemption policy formation and
implementation.
Even if members of Congress choose to delegate preemption policy
implementation based primarily on how well courts and agencies
address federalism, corrective justice, and regulatory efficiency
issues, it stands to reason that those members would still wish to
retain some means of correction and adjustment. Stated differently,
the need to delegate some preemption policymaking and implemen-
tation responsibility does not also connote, let alone necessitate,
congressional abdication of preemption policymaking to courts or
agencies. Given an increasing scholarly and popular interest in
(2008) (analyzing the comparative institutional competence of courts and agencies to manage
federalism concerns).
98. See Merrill, supra note 10, at 753-59 (describing the comparative strengths and
weaknesses of Congress, the courts, and administrative agencies in formulating and
implementing federal preemption policy); cf. Sharkey, supra note 13, at 485-502 (describing
the institutional advantages of agencies in making preemption determinations, and the role
that courts can play in limiting agency preemptive power).
99. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 406-07.
100. See id. at 369.
101. See id. at 426-28.
102. See id. at 426-34.
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preemption issues,  it is perhaps unrealistic to expect members of103
Congress to leave its management wholly to the other branches of
the federal government. An approach to analyzing the institutional
choice of preemption that does not account for congressional
delegation is, therefore, incomplete.
If one assumes that Congress prefers that the results produced by
its legislation trend in a particular policy direction, it would stand
to reason that Congress should have some idea when drafting it
as to how courts or agencies would construe that legislation. Stated
differently, Congress would be expected to provide delegates with
discretion if it is generally confident that the delegate will, in
the end, effect congressionally selected policy goals. By contrast,
Congress would be expected to provide its delegates with little
discretion if those delegates are not likely to give effect to congres-
sional policy choices.  It would be sensible therefore for Congress104
to try to retain some powers of correction and influence after the
legislative language has been settled upon and the delegation has
been made.105
As a general matter, Congress can use ex ante or ex post control
mechanisms to monitor how the governmental agents to which it
delegates the implementation of its legislative mandates conform to
congressional goals.  The primary ex ante control mechanism is106
legislative text which, broadly speaking, can take two forms. First,
Congress can clearly and comprehensively enumerate the consider-
ations that go into implementing its legislation. If effectively
executed, this method reduces the interpretive latitude of the
implementing agent and, presumably, produces results more in
103. See Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 811 (2008)
(“Much scholarly and public attention has now turned to another aspect of the Court's
federalism jurisprudence, the preemption of state law.”).
104. See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-94 (2d ed. 1979) (noting that
delegation of authority needs to be checked, guided, and safeguarded).
105. At a minimum , members of Congress, who are presumably heavily influenced by
changes in public opinion, would want to secure for themselves the option of changing their
views regarding the policies underlying enacted legislation and to have those changes
reflected in the ways enacted legislation is interpreted and implemented. See Rodriguez,
supra note 64, at 218.
106. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWER: A TRANSACTION COST
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 25 (1999).
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keeping with legislative intent.  One such attempt at detailed107
instruction is section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which
specifically enumerates the circumstances under which, and the
extent to which, federal law displaces state law.  Another is section108
514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
which has produced less than stellar results.109
Alternatively, Congress can enact broad implementing language
that, on its face, welcomes some measure of interpretive latitude.
For example, section 1044(b)(1)(B) of the Dodd-Frank Act instructs
courts and the OCC to apply implied conflict and obstacle preemp-
tion doctrines when determining the applicability of state laws to
national bank and federal thrift activities.  In drafting this section,110
Congress essentially left the details of preemption policy to future
determination.  Scholars have uniformly concluded that these111
implied preemption doctrines, with one possible exception,  invite112
and often require a substantial measure of judicial policymaking.113
In other words, the instruction to apply these implied preemption
doctrines is tantamount to an implicit delegation of authority to the
courts and stands in stark contrast to the ex ante legislative control
created by specifically detailed legislative language. Instead of
107. See id. at 26 (arguing that Congress can control bureaucratic drift, the tendency of
agencies to ignore congressional policy preferences in favor of their own, by “passing specific,
detail-filled legislation”). Of course, the increased complexity of such a statute could increase
the rate of erroneous application, thus creating bureaucratic drift of a different kind.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1998).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). Criticisms of ERISA’s preemption provisions are legion. See,
e.g., Fisk, supra note 46, at 35.
110. Dodd-Frank W all Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1044(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
111. Moreover, one of the most intriguing aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act’s national bank
preemption provisions is its dramatic increase in judicial preemption discretion at the expense
of agency discretion. See infra Part III.
112. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 234, 261 (2000) (proposing a
“logical-contradiction” test for preemption, under which courts “ignore state law if (but only
if) state law contradicts a valid rule established by federal law, so that applying the state law
would entail disregarding the valid federal rule”); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187,
1209 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating for the abandonment of the Court’s implied
preemption jurisprudence in favor of preemption test similar to that proposed by Professor
Nelson). The Supreme Court has yet to embrace the logical-contradiction test.
113. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 10, at 742 (“[C]ourts are actually making substantive
[policy] decisions in the name of preemption.”); Sharpe, supra note 5, at 568 (“[T]here is a
puzzling and fundamental disconnect between what the Supreme Court says in its preemption
cases, and what it does in its preemption cases.”).
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attempting to enumerate the specific instances in which state law
is displaced by federal law, section 1044(b)(1)(B) gives courts wide
latitude to identify those instances themselves.
Ex post control mechanisms, by contrast, comprise the monitoring
methods available to Congress after it makes a delegation.  In114
theory, such mechanisms are numerous, and their use depends in
some measure on propriety and the most cost-effective means of
discovering and addressing delegation problems.  Members of115
Congress can, for example, resort to the relatively inexpensive
methods of sending letters or placing calls to delegates, threatening
to hold potentially embarrassing hearings or to cut funding, or
adopting resolutions staking out particular policy positions.116
Members can also hold hearings in which they publicly scrutinize
the decisions of agency officials. With substantially greater time and
effort, members can enact legislation to create private rights of
action and individual standing or to overturn an implementation
decision with which they disagree.117
When considerations of institutional choice are added, however,
delegating implementation to courts as opposed to administrative
agencies has immediate and significant consequences for the avail-
ability of these ex post control mechanisms. Courts are largely
insulated from congressional attempts at ex post influence or
control.  As a matter of governmental culture, it is inappropriate118
for members of Congress to send letters to judges expressing their
views on the potential outcomes of individual cases. While members
of Congress may file amicus briefs expressing such views, courts are
114. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 106, at 25.
115. The classic distinction here is between “police-patrol” and “fire-alarm” monitoring
systems. Each involves costly monitoring of delegate activities, but they distribute the direct
costs of that monitoring differently. W hereas police patrols require Congress to incur
monitoring costs by proactively scrutinizing delegate behavior itself, fire alarms empower
private individuals and interest groups to examine delegate decisions. See Mathew D.
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus
Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
116. See FISHER, supra note 14, at 78.
117. Cf. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 106, at 24 (noting that interest groups are well
informed about relevant delegate actions).
118. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 445
(1989) (observing that many of the procedural mechanisms used by Congress to control agency
behavior are not available to control courts).
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under no obligation to read them, let alone follow them.  Although119
Congress could attempt to shape judicial opinions through the
appropriations process,  doing so would be both unwise and inef-120
fective. In all likelihood, the public would view a congressional
threat of cutting or increasing judicial funding to influence case
results as an unseemly infringement on the independence that
Article III affords the federal courts. Even if this were not the case,
an increase or a reduction in judicial appropriations is unlikely to
be sufficiently targeted to control the decisions of the 1776 judges
and magistrates currently authorized by the federal court system.121
Similar hurdles would impede congressional efforts to influence
state judges, with the additional impediment that Congress can only
conditionally promise to direct or threaten to withhold funds to state
court systems; such entreaties would first have to go to state
legislators who would then, in turn, have to lobby their courts on
Congress’s behalf.122
Administrative agencies, by contrast, are much more susceptible
to ex post congressional influence than are federal courts.  Even in123
the case of independent agencies or commissions, the cultural
proscriptions against congressional ex parte contacts with their
directors, commissioners, or board members are far less robust than
they are with federal judges.  Congressional committees can target124
119. Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389,
1451 n.311 (2005).
120. Todd D. Peterson, Controlling the Federal Courts Through the Appropriations Process,
1998 W IS. L. REV. 993, 1033 (1998).
121. See JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 34-37 (2009).
122. The possible exception here would be with popularly elected state judges, where the
effects of the party system might be brought to bear. Cf. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law , 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 777 (1995)
(commenting on effects when those charged with protecting the minority are chosen by the
majority).
123. See FISHER, supra note 14, at 71, 73, 75-78; J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public
Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2235-36 (2005) (“Potential sanctions for an
agency’s failure to fulfill statutory mandates include political embarrassment at congressional
hearings, vulnerability to auditing and investigation, the threat of losing appropriations, and
even elimination of the agency.”).
124. See Marshall J. Berger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1194-95 (2000); cf. Bill
Mears, Scalia Won’t Recuse Himself from Cheney Case, CNN.COM (Mar. 18, 2004),
http://articles.cnn.com /2004-03-18/justice/scalia.recusal_1_cheney-case-recuse-scalia-and-
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specific agency activities through the appropriations process,  and125
have some measure of control over the political appointments made
to those agencies by the President.  Additionally, Congress can126
empower courts to monitor agency actions to ensure compliance
with its goals.  Agencies, on the other hand, are not in a position127
to monitor the activities of the federal courts. The availability of
these ex post controls may be crucial to correcting the interpretation
and implementation mistakes that agencies are bound to make.128
Thus, even if Congress is unable to build the coalition needed to
alter the language of a legislative mandate, to overturn agency
decisions or actions, or to revise agency procedures,  there are129
numerous informal mechanisms to which it can resort.130
Given that courts are less susceptible to ex post congressional
influence than are administrative agencies, the Dodd-Frank Act
stands out as somewhat unusual. The Act clearly chooses the
judiciary to implement its pro-state, antipreemption policies. For
example, the Act instructs the courts to review OCC preemption
determinations with Skidmore as opposed to Chevron deference,131
which allows courts to shape preemption policy to a far greater
cheney?_s=PM:LAW.
125. David S. Rubenstein, “Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of Administrative
Power, 51 W M. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2207 (2010).
126. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 136
(2006).
127. Martin Kellner, Congressional Grants of Standing in Administrative Law and Judicial
Review: Proposing a New Standing Doctrine from a Delegation Perspective, 30 HAMLINE L.
REV. 315, 337 (2007).
128. Cf. FIORINA, supra note 70, at 48.
129. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. W eingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1450-51 (2003).
130. This is not to say that members of Congress have free reign over agency conduct.
There are meaningful legal checks on the level of influence they may exert on agency officials.
See FISHER, supra note 14, at 80-82. Nor is it the position of this Article that agencies are
perfectly “faithful agents,” in that they immediately or necessarily follow Congress’s post-
enactment influence. Moreover, agencies may not in all instances be more useful con-
gressional delegates than courts, as there are circumstances in which congressional purposes
m ay be better served by the courts than by agencies. The point here is simply that, as a
general matter, agencies are more easily influenced by Congress than is the judiciary and, as
a consequence, Congress may generally find delegating to agencies more desirable than
delegating to courts.
131. Dodd-Frank W all Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1044(b)(5)(n), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015 (2010) (to be codified in 12 U.S.C. § 25b).
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extent than otherwise possible under the Court’s decision in
Cuomo.  The Act also adopts the implied conflict and obstacle132
preemption standards described by the Court in Barnett Bank v.
Nelson.  As already described, these implied preemption tests133
invite courts to engage in substantial policymaking,  and are134
considered by the courts to be implicit judicial delegations. Finally,
the Act burdens the OCC’s preemption decision-making procedures
without similarly burdening the procedures employed by the
courts.135
Taken together, these features invite the inference that Congress
regarded the judiciary, and the Supreme Court particularly, as the
implementing institution least likely to constrict state regulatory
authority in contravention of the legislative bargains memorialized
by the Act.  Unlike the typical instance in which Congress is silent136
on the delegation issue and the delegation devolves on the courts by
default,  Congress specifically chose the courts over the OCC in the137
Dodd-Frank Act. This may be the case for either of two reasons.
First, it may be that Congress can exert more effective posten-
actment control over the meaning and application of the Act if the
courts rather than the OCC are chiefly charged with its implemen-
tation. This explanation is somewhat implausible, however, con-
sidering that courts are not as susceptible to ex post congressional
controls as are administrative agencies.  138
Second, and more plausibly, it may be that the potential for
postenactment judicial policy drifts is less concerning, and hence the
available methods of postenactment monitoring available to
Congress would be adequate to correct them. There are certainly
potential benefits to delegating preemption authority to courts as
opposed to agencies. Perhaps chief among them is the potential to
132. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009).
133. 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
134. See supra Part I.C.
135. § 1044(c), 124 Stat. at 2016.
136. See infra Part III. Congress also made the OCC an independent agency. See § 315, 124
Stat. at 1524, which indicates Congress’s intent to increase its influence over the agency while
limiting the influence of the President. This change indicates some awareness on Congress’s
part of the need to retain some measure of control over the policy decisions m ade by its
delegates. See id.
137. See supra Part I.C.1.
138. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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protect Congress’s preemption policy choices from the contrary
views of future Presidents, particularly if the Presidency is con-
trolled by an opposing political party. Whereas a President can have
substantial influence over how an administrative agency resolves
preemption issues,  a President is unlikely to have similar in-139
fluence over how courts resolve those issues. Committing these
decisions to courts can therefore have a greater potential to lock in
desired results by insulating them from the Executive’s competing
policy preferences. The lingering concern would then be judicial
policy drift. One would expect Congress to protect its preemption
policy choices from the President by delegating authority to courts
where Congress is confident that it can rein in judicial policy drift,
or where such policy drift is unlikely to occur. 
Given that the members of Congress and their staffers who were
responsible for the Dodd-Frank Act’s national bank preemption
provisions could not have reasonably expected to exercise more
robust ex post legislative controls over the courts than over the
OCC, it would follow that they instead assumed, or would have
assumed had they specifically considered the matter, that the Court
would by and large interpret and apply the Act’s preemption
provisions in a manner that tended to favor more state regulation.
At a minimum, they could have assumed that the Court would do so
more frequently than would the OCC. Either of these assumptions
could be based on an expectation that the Court will recognize and
respect the overall pro-state leanings of the Act’s national banking
preemption provisions, or on the expectation that the Court will
construe the Act’s terms by relying on its legislative history, over
which members of Congress have substantial control.140
139. Unless, of course, the agency is independent and thus more insulated from the
President’s influence. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 25-26 (2010) (describing how agency independence
shifts control from the President to Congress); see also Sharkey, supra note 43 (noting that
the Dodd-Frank Act makes the OCC an independent agency, and hence insulates it from
Executive Order 13,132, which imposes specific federalism procedures on agencies).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
196 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:163
   II. PREEMPTION AND LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER JUDICIAL  
INTERPRETATION
As already described, Congress has numerous monitoring
strategies and procedural devices at its disposal to ensure that its
chosen policy delegates conform to legislatively created mandates.141
Because the range of ex post control options available to Congress
is quite limited when its chosen delegate is the judiciary, by far the
most important of these options is the language of its statutory
enactments.  However, courts will inevitably stray from the142
intended effects of even the most carefully crafted statutes.  As a143
consequence, Congress must either attempt to influence the
methods by which courts will interpret its legislation in future
cases, or it must be confident that the courts will settle on interpre-
tations that adhere to its conception of statutory purpose. Both
options require some understanding of the judiciary’s preemption
policy presumptions. This Part first describes the monitoring
mechanisms available to Congress when its chosen delegate is the
judiciary and discusses how those methods can be used most
effectively given different preemption policy goals. It then uses two
areas of the Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence—implied
statutory remedies and the clear statement rule—to illustrate the
effect that judicial default rules have on federal legislation in
contexts closely related to preemption. This Part then identifies the
preemption default adopted by the Court, contrasts it with the
Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence, and discusses its implica-
tions for Congress’s preemption policy goals.
A. Influence over Judicial Interpretation
At the outset, it is important to recognize that many of Congress’s
monitoring difficulties could theoretically be reduced simply by
141. See McNollgast, Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative
Approach to Administrative Procedures, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 307, 312-13 (1990).
142. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle on Text, Context, and the
Rule of Law , 79 N.C. L. REV. 577, 600 n.72 (2001).
143. See Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation:
Interpreting Law or Changing Law , 43 W M. & MARY L. REV. 539, 561 & n.91 (2001).
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enacting clear statutory mandates regarding its intent to preempt
state law. Though it is an open question as to what the Supremacy
Clause requires, Congress could, for example, dictate the legal
consequence of a court’s finding of irreconcilable conflict between
state and federal law by specifically directing the court to choose
state law,  or by explicitly stating its intent to occupy an entire144
field of regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act, in one notable instance,
does exactly that.  Alternatively, Congress could create a federal145
statutory remedy in those instances where the Court’s preemption
decisions eliminate state remedial opportunities.146
As already explained, there are numerous reasons why Congress
rarely does so.  Even where Congress has managed to draft a clear147
preemption or saving clause, there is a temporal aspect to statutory
interpretation that can raise a barrier to the courts acting as
faithful agents: deciding to which Congress courts owe their
allegiance. Courts must choose whether to follow the directives of
the Congress that enacted the potentially preemptive statutory
language or the directives of the sitting Congress that has the power
to overrule its interpretation.  It is safe to assume that the148
preferences of these two bodies will not align, given that the
differences in their personnel reflect intervening changes in voter
144. The test case would be one involving so-called “impossibility” preemption, where
federal and state requirements conflict to such a degree that simultaneous compliance with
both is impossible. If the Supremacy Clause operates as a constraint on Congress’s legislative
power, then Congress could not “opt out” of having its laws trump those of the states. If, on
the other hand, the Supremacy Clause operates as a default rule that privileges federal law,
then Congress could expressly permit compliance with state law when it conflicts with federal
law. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462 (2002) (“In cases of actual conflict between state and
federal commands, federal law indisputably prevails under the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI. The recurring question is whether Congress, although possessed of power to displace state
rules, has manifested its intent to do so.”).
145. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1004(b)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015 (2010) (stating that the
Act’s preemption standards relating to state consumer financial protection laws “[do] not
occupy the field in any area of State law”).
146. A proposed but ultimately rejected provision in the House version of the Dodd-Frank
Act would have had a similar effect. See W all Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 4404(d) (2009) (requiring the OCC or a court to find that a
substantive federal consumer protection standard is in place before preempting a state law).
147. See supra Part I.B.
148. See John Ferejohn, Law, Legislation, and Positive Political Theory, in MODERN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 191, 204 (Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Hanushek eds., 1995).
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preferences.  Courts that view their role as protecting the legisla-149
tive bargain reached by the enacting Congress will likely be mindful
of how the sitting Congress will respond to their decisions—so as to
further minimize the possibility of legislative override —but will150
ultimately decide cases that do not give full effect to the preferences
of the sitting Congress.  This type of “strategic jurisprudence”151
further complicates Congress’s attempts to control judicial interpre-
tation of its enactments.  Courts may therefore be either unwilling152
or unable to follow Congress’s instructions due to factors wholly
exogenous to the clarity of the baseline statutory text.
Whether one accepts or rejects the premise that judges do not
always strive to fully enforce Congress’s policy choices, it follows
that Congress would not just want to control the statutory language
that gives formal expression to its policy choices, but it would also
want to control, or at least to heavily influence, the methods of
statutory interpretation employed by the judiciary when applying
statutory language to the facts of specific cases.  In this regard,153
and contrary to what others who study preemption have sug-
gested,  statutory language need not be used solely as an ex ante154
control mechanism. It can also be used as an indirect ex post control
mechanism. 
By altering the form of its preemption provisions, Congress can
influence the availability of the interpretive methods employed by
the courts, which are primarily textualism and purposivism.  The155
available method of interpretation, in turn, affects the amount of ex
post control Congress exercises over judicial interpretation of its
statutes. For example, choosing to adopt a clear preemption rule, as
opposed to a preemption standard, makes it easier for courts to
149. See id.
150. See supra Part I.A.
151. Ferejohn, supra note 148, at 204.
152. See id.
153. See Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 892-93 (2009).
154. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 10, at 754 (asserting that Congress is not well suited to
manage preemption issues because, in part, “[l]egislation operates ex ante, before particular
disputes about implementation and enforcement emerge”).
155. Of course, there are alternative interpretation methods that have been proposed by
scholars. I nevertheless limit my discussion here to textualism and purposivism because those
are the methods of interpretation primarily used in the federal courts. 
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employ textualist methods of statutory interpretation. A clear rule
in this context would provide an all but unmistakable indication of
Congress’s preemptive intent.  Courts would be left to determine156
the text’s “plain meaning” without having to resort to the primary
extratextual source of Congress’s intent: legislative history.  By157
foregoing reliance on legislative history, over which Congress exer-
cises complete control, courts are able to lessen Congress’s opportu-
nities to influence policymaking after enacting statutes.  Stated158
differently, facilitating judicial adoption of textualism “limits the
options of legislators who would seek political advantage through
opportunistic use of legislative history.”  This reduction in con-159
gressional influence produces a concomitant increase in judicial
interpretive independence.160
Clear statutory language may clearly resolve some preemption
issues. As already explained, however, Congress cannot draft pre-
emptive legislation so detailed as to anticipate all of the state-
federal conflicts that courts and agencies will invariably face.  The161
156. Courts have deemed a handful of express preemption clauses as self-executing in this
respect. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521,
533 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing self-executing provision of Clean Air Act).
157. Joel E. Tasca, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Effect of the Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute on the Complete Amount in Controversy Rule: A Case for Plain Meaning
Statutory Construction, 46 EMORY L.J. 435, 462 (1997). This is not to say that textualists do
not rely on extra-textual sources of meaning when interpreting statutory language. For
instance, they routinely rely on dictionaries to assist them in construing a text’s meaning. See
Phillip A. Rubin, Note, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in Accordance
with Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167, 175 (2010) (“[D]ictionaries are external sources
of interpretation.”).
158. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward
a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1331-32 (1990).
159. Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 223 (explaining how lim iting judicial use of legislative
history “disempowers legislators by debilitating one of the more useful ways of influencing
future interpretation”).
160. Zeppos, supra note 158, at 1332 (“Congress has historically exercised its power and
influence in ways other than the passage of legislation under Article I. By demanding that
Congress now spell out its prerogatives in the text itself, textualism inevitably lessens the
power of the legislative branch.”).
161. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. A prominent example is the express
preemption clause in the MDA. Despite specifically preempting any medical device standards
different from those promulgated by the FDA, courts have failed to agree on its proper scope
of application. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 397-99 (describing the Supreme Court’s difficulties
in determining whether the MDA preemption clause preempts state law tort design defect
claims). 
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core problem with legislative drafting in general is that some gap-
filling by Congress’s chosen delegate—whether court or agency—is
inevitable.  Preemption is no different in this respect,  though162 163
what informs that gap-filling is specific to the preemption context.164
This is why, at least in part, Congress frequently chooses to adopt
preemption standards as opposed to clear preemption rules or, even
more frequently, why Congress is simply silent as to its specific
preemptive intent.  This is also why the Court has developed the165
implied preemption doctrines to fill in gaps—or, as the case may be,
to establish federal common law. Because incomplete, vague, or
ambiguous statutory prescriptions necessarily leave policy details
to the implementation stage,  courts are hard pressed to find166
sufficient textual guidance regarding their intended effects. Courts
must then turn to extratextual sources of information to fill in the
gaps,  and one of those sources will likely be the legislative history167
that is controlled by Congress.  That legislative history—in the168
162. See Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law , 1994
SUP. CT. REV. 429, 442 (1994).
163. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 401-02.
164. See discussion supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
165. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 395-96 (discussing judicial assessment of preemption and
savings clauses that are vague and lack clarity); cf. Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31
(1996) (“Sometimes courts, when facing the pre-emption question, find language in the federal
statute that reveals an explicit congressional intent to pre-empt state law. More often, explicit
pre-emption language does not appear, or does not directly answer the question.” (citation
omitted)).
166. See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2018 & n.69 (2009) (noting that indeterminate
legislative language sometimes “reflect[s] an implicit or explicit legislative choice to delegate
to interpreters authority over policy details”).
167. Cf. Zeppos, supra note 158, at 1330 (“Broadly phrased statutes like section 1988 or the
Sherman Act in effect operate as delegations of authority to the courts to develop a federal
common law on the subject, be it attorneys’ fees or antitrust. W ith such common law statutes,
it seems inevitable that guidance must be sought from nontextual sources.”).
168. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 222. Furthermore, several empirical studies of
judicial statutory interpretation found significant reliance on legislative history. See Frank
B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1971, 1983 (2007) (reporting that “legislative intent remains a significant source for statutory
interpretation,” and that “the purported ‘death’ of legislative history is exaggerated”); Jane
S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1, 15 (1998) (determining that legislative history was cited in 49 percent of the majority
opinions during the Supreme Court’s 1996 Term); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority
in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1088, 1093 (1992)
2011] LEGISLATING PREEMPTION 201
form of conference reports, committee reports, hearings, and floor
statements—is often designed by legislators to influence judicial
interpretation.  By encouraging courts to rely on legislative169
history, Congress shifts the balance of interpretive power, and hence
policy control, toward itself and away from the courts.170
For at least two reasons, this “interpretive nudging” approach to
ex post congressional influence over judicial interpretation may not,
on its own, serve Congress equally well in all circumstances. First,
courts are not certain to rely on legislative history when construing
indeterminate statutory text.  Were courts encouraged or even171
forced to consider extratextual evidence of Congress’s preemptive
intent, it is likely that they would resort to legislative history.172
There are no guarantees, however. Despite Congress’s best efforts
to constrain courts’ options of extratextual interpretive materials,
courts are still free to ignore legislative history. The Cuomo decision
(determining that, in a random sample of 413 Supreme Court cases decided between 1890 and
1990, 32 percent cited congressional reports, 16.9 percent cited floor debates, and 12.6 percent
cited hearing materials). Even Justice Scalia, the staunchest textualist on the Court, has
joined opinions that relied in part on legislative history. See Cross, supra at 1987 (reporting
that Justice Scalia joined three opinions between 1994 and 2002 that relied on legislative
history, though he authored none himself).
169. Patricia M. W ald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306
(1990) (asserting the benefits and importance of judicial use of legislative history); see also
Zeppos, supra note 158, at 1331 (“Through judicial resort to legislative history, Congress and
its members have been able to exert continuing influence over policymaking decisions that
arise after the enactment of the statute.”).
170. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 221-23. Congress could also attempt to pass
legislation requiring courts to rely on legislative history or forbidding them to use certain
interpretive methods. Such attempts, though tried by Congress in the past, have routinely
failed. See id. at 224-25 (describing attempt to include a rule of construction provision in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991). In any event, it is unclear whether Congress is constitutionally
empowered to enact such statutes. Compare Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent:
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 211 (2001)
(arguing that Congress lacks the power to control how the judiciary interprets its statutes),
and Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective
Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 98-99 (2003), with Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2002)
(arguing that Congress has the authority to codify some methods of statutory interpretation).
171. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 223.
172. See Cross, supra note 168, at 1988 (noting that even though most believe textualism
and the use of legislative history are at odds, Justices sometimes use both when trying to
make their arguments). 
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provides an example.  The issue there was whether the OCC173
properly determined the scope of its “visitorial powers” under the
NBA. According to the OCC, “visitorial powers” included its exclu-
sive authority both to inspect and to bring law enforcement actions
against national banks.  As a consequence of this interpretation,174
the OCC claimed that the New York State Attorney General was
preempted from initiating inspection or law enforcement actions
against national banks located in the state.  Although the Court175
concluded that the term “visitorial powers” was ambiguous,  it176
made no mention of the NBA’s legislative history in concluding that
the OCC’s interpretation was unreasonably broad under Chevron.177
Justice Thomas, writing separately, also concluded that the term
“visitorial powers” was ambiguous.  Though he rejected the Court’s178
conclusion that the OCC’s interpretation was unreasonably broad,
he too declined to rely on any legislative history to support his
arguments.  When the Court ignores legislative history, Congress179
is left with legislative override as its only ex post monitoring mech-
anism.
Second, Congress cannot be sure that the courts will rely on
legislative history in the way that Congress intended or of which
Congress approves, even if courts do turn to it.  In other words,180
there is no necessarily causal relationship between the methods of
interpretation employed by the courts and the preemption results
they reach in particular cases. This point can be illustrated with a
simplified example, made under the following three limiting as-
173. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
174. Id. at 2715.
175. Id. at 2714.
176. Id. at 2715.
177. Notably, this decision not to rely on legislative history does not appear to be a
byproduct of ideological differences. W hile Justice Scalia, a staunch textualist, wrote the
majority opinion, it was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, all of whom
are inclined to rely on legislative history when faced with indeterminate legislation. See Anita
S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and
Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 251-52 (2010) (“Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Stevens exhibited the highest rates of reliance on interpretive tools that promote statute-
specific coherence—that is, legislative history, purpose, intent, and practical consequences
focused on policy constancy concerns.”).
178. 129 S. Ct. at 2722 (Thomas J., concurring).
179. Id. at 2722-23.
180. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 223.
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sumptions. First, there are two factors that dominate the outcomes
in preemption cases: methods of statutory interpretation and
background assumptions regarding the federal-state balance.
Second, each of these factors has two forms. With respect to the
methods of statutory interpretation, the first restricts the evidence
of congressional intent to the plain language of the statute,
textualism, while the second allows consideration of the statute’s
legislative history, purposivism. With respect to assumptions
regarding preemption, the first favors federal regulatory control,
while the second favors state regulatory control. Third, there are
two institutions that compete for control over these factors:
Congress and the Court. One institution’s expansion of power over
a particular factor necessarily results in a contraction of the other
institution’s power over that factor.
Given these assumptions, Table 1 below provides a simplified
representation of the legislative choices available to Congress when
attempting to guide judicial preemption policy implementation. The
methods of statutory interpretation employed by the Court could
have one of two effects on the balance of interpretive power between
Congress and the courts: they could be Congress-aggrandizing (CA)
or they could be Judiciary-aggrandizing (JA). Table 1 also assumes
that preemption cases will have one of two possible results: state
regulatory power could be aggrandized (SA), or federal regulatory






Based on these assumptions, Table 1 indicates the potential
difficulties of cabining the courts’ interpretive and preemption
choices. Assuming that Congress could successfully manipulate the
courts into adopting CA methods of interpretation, there are still
two preemption results that could result from it. Without some
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additional connecting factor, the courts could still choose either SA
or FA. Conversely, if Congress were to cede control of statutory
meaning to the courts (JA), there is still no guarantee that the
courts will then choose SA over FA, or vice versa. In sum, any
legislative effort to influence the outcome of preemption cases
through statutory interpretation requires some additional under-
standing of how the available interpretive options relate to how the
judiciary balances federal and state regulatory power. Table 1
therefore indicates that generalized increases or decreases of
interpretive control will not necessarily serve Congress’s preemption
policy goals. Rather, its choice of CA or JA must be responsive to the
judiciary’s predispositions toward SA and FA.
This insight affects the basic strategic options Congress should
consider ex ante when its members bargain for the final wording of
preemptive legislation. For example, it affects whether that legis-
lation is crafted in the form of a rule or a standard, and the specific
subjects to which the rule or standard is addressed. It also affects
how Congress should prioritize its interests. That prioritization is
reflected by the numerical values in Table 2, which assumes for
illustrative purposes that Congress would prefer to increase its own
interpretive power, but that its primary goal is to increase the
regulatory power of the states—or, put another way, to reduce the





From Congress’s perspective, the best result is the CA/SA pairing,
gained directly through clear legislative text or indirectly through
a combination of text and interpretive nudging. The second-best
result would be the direct selection of the JA/SA pairing. Assuming
that preemption reduction is prioritized over ex post statutory
control, Congress should be willing to cede control of statutory
meaning to the judiciary if doing so would still result in preemption
reduction. By contrast, Congress should avoid the CA/FA pairing.
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While it would preserve Congress’s power of ex post statutory
control, it would fail to accomplish its primary preemption-reduction
goal. Finally, the JA/FA pairing represents complete legislative
failure; not only would Congress fail to achieve its preemption-
reduction goal, it would also cede interpretive control to the courts.
If the courts are predisposed to FA, then the costs associated with
adopting a SA legislative scheme will increase. To overcome the
judiciary’s FA predisposition, members of Congress would have to
settle on specific statutory text, create favorable legislative history
and hope that the courts will rely on it, or adopt some combination
of both approaches. In other words, members of Congress who wish
to reduce preemption would need to create sufficiently persuasive
evidence to convince courts that Congress did not intend to preempt
state law. They would therefore be led to adopt CA as opposed to JA
to reach their ultimate preemption policy goal. Without knowledge
of the judiciary’s FA predisposition, those members could unwit-
tingly adopt a JA approach that would thwart their antipreemption
policy goals. Additionally, those members would have to reconsider
whether their initial antipreemption policy goal is worth the effort
if one assumes that adopting CA is more difficult than adopting JA,
which would simply involve the adoption of vague, ambiguous, or
incomplete statutory text.181
Whether Congress chooses to delegate preemption implementa-
tion primarily to courts or to agencies, it can use the specificity of
legislative text as an ex ante control mechanism. If Congress
chooses to delegate preemption policy implementation to the courts
and not to administrative agencies, interpretive nudging is the
primary ex post control mechanism it has apart from legislative
override. The right combination of textual specificity and interpre-
tive nudging to reach congressional policy goals depends on the
courts’ predisposition toward preemption. If Congress ignores this
fact, it may achieve the preemption policy outcomes it wants in
some cases, but is likely to fail in many others. 
181. The difficulties associated with adopting CA are not limited to the technical challenges
of drafting sufficiently specific language or sufficiently clear and persuasive legislative
history. Greater textual specificity also affords fewer opportunities to use ambiguity to gloss
over disagreements amongst disagreeing coalitions, to deflect interest group pressures, or to
shift the political costs of decision making to other branches of government. See Rodriguez,
supra note 64, at 218.
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B. Implied Remedies and Clear Statement Default Rules
The ultimate effectiveness of either the ex ante drafting or ex post
interpretive nudging depends in large part on the background
preemption presumptions against which the courts construe
legislative text. Courts will often fall back on their assumptions
about federalism, regulatory efficiency, or corrective justice when
faced with a federal statute that does not directly address a salient
policy question. The Court’s recent jurisprudence in two areas of
federal statutory interpretation—implied statutory remedies and
clear statement requirements—are particularly instructive in this
regard. In both areas the Court has shifted its presumed balance of
federal-state regulatory power and increased the difficulty that
Congress would have in overcoming that presumption.
1. Implied Statutory Remedies
Until relatively recently, the Supreme Court relied on traditional
purposivist methods of interpretation to determine whether
Congress intended courts to imply private causes of action in the
absence of express language doing so.  This interpretive methodol-182
ogy led the Court to rely heavily on extratextual evidence to
reconstruct Congress’s intent, which frequently resulted in the
creation of a federal right to file suit. The Court’s decision in J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak is a notable example,  one that was decided183
during the Warren Court’s general expansion of federal rights and
judicial jurisdiction.  The case involved a determination of whether184
Congress intended the antifraud provision in section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act to be enforced through private causes of
action. Under the language of the Act, enforcement rested solely
182. See infra Part II.B.1.
183. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
184. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 597 (1991)
(“The W arren Court generally expanded the scope of constitutional rights.”); Rebecca E.
Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (and Why It Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J.
255, 257 (2008) (“The many ‘activist’ rulings of the W arren Court expanding individual rights
and the jurisdiction of federal courts are the paradigmatic examples of courts protecting the
rights of minorities.”).
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with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  A unani-185
mous Court nevertheless concluded that “[p]rivate enforcement of
the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission
action.”  The Court based this conclusion not only on its reading of186
the language of the Act,  but also on several extratextual eviden-187
tiary sources it believed would illuminate the Act’s purpose: House
and Senate committee reports describing the goals of the Act and
the underlying problems it was intended to address;  the Court’s188
independent views regarding the optimal enforcement regime for
effectively enforcing the Act;  and the presumption that “it is the189
duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”  190
The federalism default rule underlying the Court’s decision
unmistakably leaned toward federal as opposed to state regulatory
authority. The effect of the Court’s decision was to expand federal
jurisdiction into an area already addressed by state tort law. The
Court made this clear by specifically rejecting the argument that the
relief afforded by any implied federal cause of action under the Act
should be limited to prospective relief because the states already
provided adequate remedies at law.  The Court underscored the191
point when it observed that, without a federal cause of action,
“victims of deceptive proxy statements would be obliged to go into
state courts for remedial relief,”  and that states may not ade-192
quately address the harms Congress intended the Act to cure.193
Although the Borak Court did not look to displace state tort law, it
did presume that Congress wanted potential shareholder plaintiffs
to have a federal alternative to the judicial procedures and remedial
schemes already provided by the several states. As the extratextual
intent evidence on which the Court relied did nothing to disturb this
185. Borak, 377 U.S. at 427 n.1.
186. Id. at 432.
187. Id. at 431-32.
188. Id. at 431 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13 (1934); S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 12 (1934)).
189. Id. at 432-33.
190. Id. at 433.
191. Id. at 434-35.
192. Id. at 434.
193. Id. at 434-35.
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presumption—to the contrary, it supported it—the presumption
drove the outcome.
The Court’s implied remedy opinions migrated slowly away from
Borak’s heavy reliance on legislative history and federal judicial
responsibility, and toward a singular focus on legislative text and
the presumption that states are well equipped to remedy private
wrongs. In Cort v. Ash, the Court recast the implied remedies issue
in a way that challenged Borak’s presumption that the federal
judiciary plays a special role in the vindication of federal rights.194
While the implied remedies test formulated by the Ash Court still
allowed courts to rely heavily on legislative history,  legislative195
history would have to be used to overcome the very different
presumption that state remedies were adequate.196
The full extent of the Court’s migration away from reliance on
legislative history and federalization was portended by Justice
Rehnquist’s influential concurrence in Cannon v. University of
Chicago, which addressed whether the Court should imply a private
right of action for sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.  Criticizing the purpose-driven approach to197
interpretation used in Borak and Ash, Justice Rehnquist advised
his colleagues to leave remedy creation to Congress.  Justice198
Rehnquist’s entreaty to his colleagues is important in two respects.
First, it assumes that state remedies are adequate to address
private injuries, and thus rejects Borak. Second, it limits the intent
evidence the Court should consider to legislative text,  and thus199
significantly narrows the opportunities that members of Congress
have to influence post-enactment judicial interpretation. In sum,
194. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Ash Court observed that it would be guided by the following
three inquiries when deciding whether to imply a private cause of action from a federal
statute that did not expressly provide one: (1) whether the plaintiff was part of the class of
persons whom Congress intended to benefit from the statute; (2) whether there were any
implicit or explicit indications that Congress intended to provide or to deny a private remedy;
and (3) whether it would be inappropriate to create a private remedy because the activity in
question was one of state concern and arose in an area of regulation that traditionally was
controlled by the states. Id. at 78.
195. The Court in Ash itself, as it did in Borak, relied not only on the text of the statute
being construed, but also on its legislative history to infer its purposes. See id. at 81-82.
196. Id. at 78.
197. 441 U.S. 677, 677 (1979).
198. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
199. Id.
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Justice Rehnquist felt that states should be presumed to provide
adequate remedies absent highly specific—that is, textual—evi-
dence of Congress’s intent to do otherwise.
The migration suggested by Justice Rehnquist in Cannon was
essentially completed in Alexander v. Sandoval.  Section 602 of200
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes federal agencies
to enforce the Act’s antidiscrimination provisions  “by issuing201
rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability.”  Pursuant to202
this section, the DOJ promulgated a rule forbidding states that
received federal grants from “utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of ... race, color, or national origin.”  The203
plaintiffs asked the Court to infer a private right of action to enforce
this regulation against the State of Alabama’s Department of Public
Safety, asserting that the Department’s English-only driver’s license
exam policy had a discriminatorily disparate impact on non-English
speakers because of their national origins.204
Finding that it could both begin and end “[its] search for
Congress’s intent with the text and structure of Title VI,”  the five-205
Justice majority rejected the plaintiffs’ request to infer a disparate
impact cause of action from section 602.  Writing for the Court,206
Justice Scalia relied on the common law canon of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius in concluding that Congress had no intention of
allowing private rights of action under section 602.  He first noted207
that Congress set out elaborate procedures to enforce regulations
200. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
201. Id. at 278. These provisions are covered in section 601, which states that “no person
shall, ‘on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from  participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity’
covered by Title VI.” Id. at 278 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006)).
202. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006)).
203. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2000)).
204. Id. at 278-79. Although the Court concluded that section 601 already provided a
private cause of action, those actions were limited to claims of intentional discrimination.
According to the Court, the only strategy available to the plaintiffs was to bring their
disparate impact claim under the broader language of section 602, because that section allows
federal agencies to promulgate rules prohibiting both intentional and disparate impact
discrimination. Id. at 280-81.
205. Id. at 288.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 289 (noting that section 602 focuses on the regulating agencies, not individuals).
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promulgated under that section.  He then emphasized that the208
section barred agencies from initiating enforcement actions without
first notifying the target state that it was in violation of the section,
or without concluding that the state’s compliance with the section
could not be secured by voluntary means.  Moreover, a federal209
agency that attempted to pull funding had to provide both the
House and Senate with reports explaining the reasons for such
action, and the agency’s decision only became effective thirty days
after the report was filed.  All of this, Justice Scalia concluded,210
“tend[ed] to contradict a congressional intent to create privately
enforceable rights through § 602.”211
On their own, neither these provisions nor their characterization
by Justice Scalia as “elaborate”  necessarily show that Congress212
intended to forbid implied private rights of action. As Justice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent, resort to the “nature of the rights
at issue,” “the relevant legislative history,” and “the text and
structure of the statute” would have led to the conclusion that the
plaintiffs were entitled to an implied remedy.  Put another way,213
Justice Stevens argued that it was not self-evident what legal
conclusions should be drawn from the fact that section 602’s
enforcement provisions are intricate. Some principle or rule must
invest them with legal significance.
Whereas Justice Stevens would have bridged this gap between
the enforcement provisions and conclusions regarding Congress’s
intent with a presumption in favor of creating federal remedies,
Justice Scalia bridged it with a presumption against doing so. The
federalism assumptions underlying the Court’s use of the expressio
unius canon appeared to reject the federally skewed balance that it
assumed in its prior implied remedies cases. In Borak, the Court
was adamant that its identification of a federal right presumed the
necessity of its creation of a federal judicial remedy.  Moreover, the214
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 290.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 312 & n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S.
667, 691, 694, 696-98, 703 (1979)).
214. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (“It is for the federal courts to adjust
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Borak Court pressed the need for a federal damages remedy despite
the acknowledged preponderance of state corporation law issues.215
In Sandoval, by contrast, the Court implicitly rejected the proposi-
tion that federal courts are presumed to be available to individuals
whose federally created rights have been violated. Rather, the
availability of such remedies is controlled by the laws enacted by
Congress;  the federal courts have no extra-statutory responsibility216
that presses them to extend federal judicial jurisdiction to the limits
of federal legislative jurisdiction. The Court’s observation that
“‘affirmative’ evidence of congressional intent must be provided for
an implied remedy, not against it,”  leaves the default federalism217
rule oriented toward state power.
Moreover, Justice Scalia drastically narrowed the body of evi-
dence that could be mustered to overcome his presumption by
relying on the textualist assumptions embedded in the expressio
unius canon. “The express provision of one method of enforcing a
substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude
others.”  Justice Scalia effectively replaced purposivist evidence of218
legislative behavior—primarily legislative history controlled by
Congress—with a textualist presumption about congressional leg-
islative behavior, the content of which was controlled by the Court.
2. The Clear Statement Rule
This confluence of textualism and federalism seen in the Court’s
implied statutory remedies cases found its clearest expression in
Gregory v. Ashcroft.  In surprisingly categorical terms, the Gregory219
Court decreed that “if Congress intends to alter the usual consti-
tutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,
it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the lang-
uage of the statute.”  Like Sandoval, Gregory indicated that the220
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief where federally secured rights are invaded.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
215. Id. at 434-35.
216. See supra notes 200-13.
217. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293 n.8.
218. Id. at 290.
219. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
220. Id. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))
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judiciary should now reject legislative history when construing
federal statutes implicating the balance between federal and state
power.221
As an initial matter, we must have some understanding of what
the Court believes the “usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government” to be. According to Gregory,
striking this balance involves what is commonly referred to as “dual
federalism.”  Although largely abandoned after the New Deal,222
dualism of this sort has become a centerpiece in much of the Court’s
recent federalism jurisprudence.  As Professor Schapiro has223
described it, dualism requires that “the states and the federal
government exercise exclusive control over nonoverlapping regions
of authority, that these realms of exclusive control are defined by
subject matter, and that the federal courts play an important and
distinctive role in guarding the boundaries of state and federal
terrain.”  The general subject matter in Gregory was the establish-224
ment of employment requirements of state constitutional officers,
judges specifically. Concluding that this was an area traditionally
regulated by the states which also involved an irreducible element
of state sovereignty,  the Court held that Congress would have to225
clearly and specifically invoke its powers under the Commerce
Clause to interfere with it.  226
This idea of a “usual balance” also assumes some default propor-
tionality between federal and state power. Prior to the New Deal,
the Court assumed that this default balance favored federal
regulation in those areas where Congress chose to legislate.227
According to one commentator, all preemption under the Commerce
Clause, for instance, was what we would now regard as field
(internal quotation marks omitted).
221. It is possible that, to the extent that it seeks to impose a particular means of statutory
interpretation on the courts through the force of stare decisis, Gregory was wrongly decided.
See supra note 170.
222. 501 U.S. at 460.
223. See Schapiro, supra note 43, at 46-52.
224. Id. at 34.
225. See 501 U.S. at 460.
226. Id. at 470.
227. David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 23 (2004).
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preemption.  “If Congress enacted a commerce regulation ... unless228
it expressly saved state law, it was deemed to have occupied the
field, and no state regulation on the subject would be permitted.”229
Since then, the areas of local concern to which the commerce power
extends have expanded, but the federalism default has changed.
Instead of assuming that Congress intends to supplant state regu-
lation when legislating under the Commerce Clause, the Court will
now assume that Congress did not intend to do so.  The clear230
statement requirement thus has a practical effect that is similar
to that of Sandoval and the Court’s implied statutory remedies
jurisprudence. It makes congressional legislation reducing state
regulatory power more difficult to draft and to adopt, and it does so
by presuming a default balance in favor of state power while
simultaneously narrowing the evidence of congressional intent that
can be invoked to counterbalance it.
C. The Centralization Default
There are clear parallels between the Court’s approach to pre-
emption cases and its approach to the “new federalism” cases
described above. Both immerse the Court in questions of federalism,
statutory interpretation, and the relationship between them. That
being said, there is a critical difference in how the Court resolves
these questions in the two contexts: the default rule underlying
many of the Court’s preemption cases is different from the default
rule underlying its new federalism cases.  This observation may231
seem patently wrong at first blush: after all, the Court has insisted
in some cases that it will not presume that Congress intended to
preempt state law in areas where the states have traditionally
controlled regulation.  It is all the more surprising given that this232
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Gardbaum, supra note 30, at 806.
231. See Fallon, supra note 144, at 471 (observing that the Court has “bypassed
opportunities to promote federalism through doctrines involving ... federal preemption”);
Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353
(2006) (arguing that the Court has employed preemption to protect emerging national
commercial markets from the negative externalities imposed by hostile state regulation).
232. See infra note 321.
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presumption is consistent with the largely state-favoring work of the
Court’s new federalism cases. These cases indicate that the default
rule of “Our Federalism” is that states hold regulatory sway absent
overt and specific indications by Congress to the contrary.233
From a practical standpoint, however, and as several scholars
have pointed out, the presumption against preemption does not
play an important role in the Court’s preemption jurisprudence.234
To the contrary, the Court has repeatedly hinted at a Centralization
Default, which makes it more difficult for Congress to choose an
antipreemption policy scheme.235
As Professors Greve and Klick have noted, there is a perceived
discontinuity “between the Rehnquist Court’s federalism cases and
its preemption decisions.”  They have further observed that “[i]n236
preemption law ... the justices often seem to ‘switch sides’: liberals
almost always vote ‘against the states’ in federalism cases—and
often against preemption, and thus ‘for the states,’ in preemption
cases. Conservative justices often flip-flop in the opposite direc-
tion.”  In describing the preemption decisions of the Supreme237
Court’s 1999 term, Professor Fallon observed that “[f]our of the
233. See supra Part II.B.
234. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach
to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1318-24 (2004) (arguing that the Court has abandoned
the presumption against preemption, which embodies the federalism considerations at the
heart of preemption policymaking); Sharkey, supra note 13, at 458.
235. Several Justices have hinted at two other default rules that have yet to gain majority
support. The first is a remedial default rule implied by Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion
in Riegel. There she observed that “[i]t is ‘difficult to believe that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse’ for large numbers of consum ers injured by
defective medical devices.” Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 337 (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)); cf. Schapiro,
supra note 43, at 51 (asserting that a presumption of concurrent state and federal regulatory
involvem ent “would decrease implied preemption of state laws”). A similar sentiment was
expressed by the dissenters (Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg) in M edtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487. This remedial default would force Congress to clearly express its
intent to eliminate state tort remedies without providing a federal alternative. The second is
a state autonomy default rule championed solely by Justice Thomas. The effect of such a
default is to drastically reduce the frequency of federal preemption. It would eliminate most
of the implied preemption doctrines, and would presume the primacy of state regulatory
regimes absent an actual conflict between state and federal law or an express statutory
directive from Congress. See Sharkey, supra note 33, at 65-70.
236. Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 47 (2006).
237. Id.
2011] LEGISLATING PREEMPTION 215
Court’s five most conservative, generally pro-federalism justices ...
found federal preemption in each instance, and Justice Thomas
agreed in every case but one.”  More recent statistical studies of238
the Court’s preemption jurisprudence have also shown that the
Court has generally been more sympathetic to claims of pre-
emption.  Speaking specifically of the Roberts Court, Dean239
Chemerinsky has observed that the Court, far from adopting a
presumption against preemption, has actually adopted a presump-
tion in favor of it.  The reason for this trend may be policy-driven.240
The Justices may generally be more inclined to favor regulatory
efficiency as opposed to corrective justice or state-regarding
federalism. Doing so would lean the Court toward preemption
instead of away from it. As already discussed, Justice Scalia’s
statement in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., regarding the comparative
decisional competence of state legislatures and state juries, supports
such an inference.  Others have suggested that this trend is driven241
by political party interests.242
The reason may also be doctrinal, in the sense that the Court’s
implied preemption tests overwhelm the limitations that would
otherwise be set by its express preemption tests. In Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, the Court stated that Congress’s inclusion of a
preemption clause in a statutory scheme should serve as the sole
evidence of its preemptive intent.  The implicit corollary was that243
federal courts should not resort to extratextual methods of statutory
interpretation to infer the existence or extent of Congress’s preemp-
238. See Fallon, supra note 144, at 472.
239. See Greve & Klick, supra note 236, at 52, 57 tbl.5 (finding that 52 percent of 105
preemption decisions from the Rehnquist Court era were decided in favor of preemption;
finding 62.5 percent preemption rate in 32 products liability cases involving preemption of
state common-law tort claims from 1986 to 2004; and finding that the rate increases to 67.6
percent when cases are restricted to the “Second Rehnquist Court,” beginning in 1994).
240. Chemerinsky, supra note 234, at 1318-24; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts
Court at Age Three, 54 W AYNE L. REV. 947, 968-72 (2008) (noting, as of the writing of the
article, that “[e]very preemption case decided so far by the Roberts Court ha[d] been decided
in favor of finding preemption”); Metzger, supra note 89, at 10 (observing that the Court has
tended to favor preemption over the last decade).
241. See supra Part I.A.
242. See generally Linda S. M ullenix, Strange Bedfellows: The Politics of Preemption, 59
CASE W . RES. L. REV. 837, 839-43 (2009) (discussing the alliance on preemption issues of
otherwise opposed business and political interest groups). 
243. 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992).
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tive intent.  Such methods are more appropriately reserved for244
when Congress’s intent cannot be inferred from the text due to its
vagueness, ambiguities, or omissions.
The Court has reversed course since Cipollone, emphasizing in-
stead that “the existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy
Clause does not depend on express congressional recognition that
federal and state law may conflict.”  Although an express preemp-245
tion or saving clause can be clear evidence of Congress’s preemptive
intent, it may not be definitive evidence. The Court can still displace
or eliminate state regulatory activity, and it will do so without
regard to whether Congress has included an express preemption or
saving clause in the statutory language. 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. serves as an example.246
There the Court addressed whether federal automobile safety
regulations promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA) preempted a state tort action alleging
that the defendant automaker negligently failed to equip the
plaintiff ’s car with driver’s side airbags.  The NTMVSA included247
express preemption and saving clauses, the latter providing that
“‘compliance with’ a federal safety standard ‘does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law.’”  The Court first248
concluded that the NTMVSA did not expressly preempt state
common law actions.  The Court then determined that “the saving249
clause (like the express pre-emption provision) does not bar the
ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”  Finally, the250
Court held that the plaintiff ’s state tort suit was preempted because
it “stood as an obstacle” to the attainment of federal objectives.251
Other of the Court’s preemption cases also point out that the
244. Cf. id.
245. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
246. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
247. Id. at 865.
248. Id. at 868 (alteration omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1998)).
249. Id. (“W e have found no convincing indication that Congress wanted to pre-empt, not
only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law tort actions.”).
250. Id. at 869.
251. Id. at 881.
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presence of explicit, statutory expression of Congress’s preemptive
intent may not definitively resolve the preemption question.252
Given Geier and similar cases, one could reasonably ask what
Congress could have possibly done differently; it enacted a saving
clause that explicitly preserved state tort claims even when the
manufacturer complied with federal regulations. Assuming, as
seems reasonable, that Congress did not actually intend regulations
promulgated under the NTMVSA to preempt state tort claims, Geier
illustrates the importance of understanding the Court’s preemption
leanings and addressing them. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion
assumed that Congress would want the Court to apply “ordinary
pre-emption principles”  when the Court discovered a conflict or an253
obstacle. This seems to also assume that Congress did not itself
identify such conflicts or obstacles but would have resolved them in
favor of preemption if it had. The operative presumption, then, is
that where a state law conflicts or interferes with federal regulation,
Congress always intends the state law to yield unless there is a
sufficiently specific and contrary indication.  This does not seem254
to be an unreasonable presumption, but it may nevertheless be
wrong in some instances. The general lesson from Geier is as
follows: where Congress recognizes the possibility of a conflict or
state-based obstacle but nevertheless wants to yield to state
authority, the Centralization Default requires it to clearly state as
much.  255
252. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-65 (2002) (“Congress’s inclusion of
an express pre-emption clause ‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption
principles.’” (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 869)); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-
88 (1995) (describing as “without merit” the assertion that “implied pre-emption cannot exist
when Congress has chosen to include an express pre-emption clause in a statute”).
253. Geier, 529 U.S. at 871.
254. Justice Breyer made a similar observation in Barnett Bank v. Nelson. 517 U.S. 25, 30
(1996) (“[The preemption] question is basically one of congressional intent. Did Congress, in
enacting the Federal Statute, intend to exercise its constitutionally delegated authority to set
aside the laws of a State? If so, the Supremacy Clause requires courts to follow federal, not
state, law.”).
255. 529 U.S. at 868, 871-72 (concluding that while Congress has the power to select the
state law in a state/federal conflict, “there is no reason to believe Congress has done so here”).
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III. LEGISLATING PREEMPTION IN CONTEXT: THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Congress has two core decisions to make when crafting preemp-
tion legislation. First, it must decide whether to delegate primary
implementation authority to courts or to administrative agencies.
Administrative agencies are more susceptible to congressional
monitoring  and hence more susceptible to correction when they256
drift away from Congress’s preemption policy choices.  Despite this257
fact, Congress either fails to make an explicit delegation decision,
leaving the task to the courts by default, or specifically chooses
courts over agencies. Second, assuming that preemption delegation
has primarily fallen to the courts, Congress must craft its legislation
to be responsive to the Supreme Court’s Centralization Default.
Whether Congress resorts to clear rules, broad standards, robust
legislative histories, or some combination thereof, will largely
depend on whether it must overcome the Centralization Default or
whether it can take advantage of it.
The ambitious national bank preemption scheme set out in the
Dodd-Frank Act provides a timely and interesting case to which to
apply the foregoing analytical framework. As described below,258
Congress attempted to provide states with a greater role in the
provision of consumer protections, and it did so by reducing the
preemptive power held by the OCC and the OTS and by increasing
the preemptive authority of the federal courts. Given Congress’s
monitoring challenges with respect to the Court, and given the
Centralization Default, there is reason to be skeptical about the
Act’s institutional choices. This Part begins with a brief history of
national banking regulation, which provides the political and
regulatory backdrop against which Congress drafted the Dodd-
Frank Act’s national bank preemption provisions. It then describes
those provisions, focusing on their delegation of preemption
authority to the courts and the preemption standard that the Act
adopts. The Part concludes with an assessment of the likely
effectiveness of the Act’s national bank preemption scheme, given
256. Beermann, supra note 126, at 122-23.
257. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
258. See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
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the monitoring and Centralization Default considerations discussed
in previous sections of the Article.
A. Congressional Responses to Expanded National Bank      
Preemption
The years preceding the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act saw a
significant expansion of federal banking regulation. Beginning in
the 1990s, the OCC and OTS relied on preemption arguments to
assert greater regulatory authority over the state-chartered
affiliates and subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts.259
For federal thrifts, courts gave the Home Owners’ Loan Act
(HOLA),  and regulations promulgated pursuant to it by the OTS260
field preemptive effect.  Over the same period, Congress, the261
courts, and the OCC greatly expanded the scope of federal preemp-
tion of state laws applicable to national bank activities. For exam-
ple, in 1994, Congress enacted the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,  which permitted national262
banks to open branches in multiple states.  In an opinion letter263
issued shortly thereafter, the OCC granted national banks the
power to export interest rates from both the state in which the bank
was headquartered and the state in which one of its branches was
located.  This decision allowed national banks to select the highest264
available interest rate regardless of state laws that would have
otherwise prohibited them.265
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Barnett Bank v.
Nelson, which invalidated a state insurance law prohibiting national
259. Arthur E. W ilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority
and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 283-84 (2004).
260. 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (2006).
261. See Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2005); Bank of
Am. v. City of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (“This court has recognized that
regulation of federal savings associations by the OTS has been so ‘pervasive as to leave no
room for state regulatory control.’” (quoting Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein,
604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979), aff’ d, 445 U.S. 921 (1980))).
262. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006).
263. Id. § 1842(d); see also Matthew Dyckman et al., Financial Regulatory Reform—The
Dodd-Frank Act Rolls Back Federal Preemption, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 129, 158 (2010).
264. See Dyckman et al., supra note 263, at 274.
265. See id.
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banks from selling insurance in towns of 5,000 or fewer residents.266
The Court in essence applied conflict and obstacle preemption
standards to national banks, deeming preempted state laws that
“prevent or significantly interfere” with a national bank’s exercise
of its federally granted powers.  In 2004, and largely in response267
to the Barnett Bank decision, the OCC issued two rules that further
expanded the scope of federal preemption. The first provided that
national banks and their operating subsidiaries were immune from
state laws that “obstruct, impair or condition” a national bank’s
exercise of its powers to make loans or to take deposits.  The268
intended effect was to preempt almost all state consumer protection
laws regulating the lending activities of national banks. The second
rule restricted the authority of states to exercise so-called
“visitorial” powers on national banks and their nonbank operating
affiliates, making their examination the exclusive province of the
OCC.  These regulations were consistently upheld by the lower269
federal courts, which Chevron deferred to the OCC’s interpretation
of the preemptive scope of the National Bank Act.  Moreover, the270
Court in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. upheld the OCC’s asser-
tion of exclusive visitorial authority.  Although the Court’s271
subsequent decision in Cuomo refused to extend the OCC’s preemp-
tive powers to state enforcement of state fair lending laws against
national banks,  it also declined to rule out the possibility that272
Chevron deference applied to the OCC’s interpretation of the NBA’s
preemptive scope.273
Due to this sustained expansion of federal banking preemption
and the upheaval caused by the recent economic crisis, many
antipreemption advocates viewed the OCC, the OTS, Congress, and
266. 517 U.S. 25, 29, 37 (1996).
267. Id. at 33.
268. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4009, 34.4 (2010).
269. Id. § 7.4000.
270. See Nat’l City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 331-33 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing
W ells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 2005); W achovia Bank, N.A. v.
Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir. 2005); W achovia Bank, N.A. v. W atters, 431 F.3d 556, 560
(6th Cir. 2005)).
271. 550 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2007).
272. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2720-21 (2009).
273. See id. at 2715 (invoking “the familiar Chevron framework,” but not explicitly applying
that framework to the OCC’s interpretation of “visitorial powers” as used in the NBA).
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the federal courts as being hostile to robust consumer protection
laws,  most of which were adopted and enforced at the state level.274
Suspicion of the OCC in particular has been profound over the past
two decades, with many outside observers concluding that the
agency has been too solicitous of the national banks it is charged
with regulating, or so single-mindedly focused on its mandate to
ensure the soundness of national banks that it has consistently
neglected competing consumer protection concerns.275
Although the Dodd-Frank Act clearly attempts to respond by
scaling back the dominant role played by federal administrative
agencies in consumer financial protection, it does so in a way that
shows Congress’s preference for delegating rather than resolving
difficult and potentially contentious preemption issues.  A primary276
example is the Act’s codification of the preemption standard used in
Barnett Bank.277
As the process that led to the Act’s codification of Barnett Bank
demonstrates, the substantive preemption standard to be applied to
the NBA and the HOLA was a matter of significant disagreement.
The Treasury Department had initially proposed the adoption of a
bright-line, mandatory rule eliminating federal preemption of
generally applicable state consumer protection laws.  This278
proposal gained little traction in Congress, and the House Financial
Services Committee chose instead to propose a standard-based
approach that limits preemption to situations in which state law
“prevents, significantly interferes [with], or materially impairs” the
capacity of a national bank to conduct its banking business. In other
words, the Committee chose selected portions of the Barnett Bank
274. See Mark Furletti, Comment, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the
Preemption of State Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 447 (2004)
(describing vociferous state and interest group criticism of the OCC’s preemption policies).
275. See Metzger, supra note 89, at 27 & nn.122-23; W ilmarth, supra note 259, at 352-53.
276. Dodd-Frank W all Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1044(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2015-16 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 75b). The one
possible exception to the Act’s general thrust of preemption delegation is its overruling of the
Court’s decision in Watters, which ruled that federal preemption extends to the activities of
a national bank’s subsidiaries and affiliates as well as to the activities of the bank itself. See
id. § 1044(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 2015.
277. Id. § 1044(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 2015.
278. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 62 (2009) [hereinafter Treasury W hite
Paper].
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decision as its preemption standard. Believing that the Committee’s
selection too narrowly construed the breadth of preemption per-
mitted by Barnett Bank, Representative Melissa Bean of Illinois
proposed additional, pro-preemption language.  The Senate279
Banking Committee went even further, including a citation to
Barnett Bank itself in the Act’s final language.  While the House280
initially rejected this change, it eventually agreed to it.  281
This procedural history of Barnett Bank’s codification shows that
it was not intended to completely unfetter the states’ authority to
apply their consumer protection laws to national banks and federal
thrifts. There was insufficient political will, and hence an insuffi-
cient number of House and Senate votes, to eliminate federal pre-
emption altogether as suggested by the Treasury Department.
Rather, Barnett Bank ’s inclusion was intended to provide states
with significantly greater regulatory authority than they were
previously afforded by the OTS and the OCC,  while also preserv-282
ing federal power to provide the exclusive rules of decisions in
particular circumstances.
Despite this continuous back-and-forth regarding the Barnett
Bank preemption standard, and despite the high level of suspicion
with which the OCC was regarded, there was never any serious
attempt to enumerate the specific categories of state consumer
financial protection laws or specific bank activities that would be
subject to federal preemption. With the House’s rejection of the
Treasury Department’s blanket ban on federal preemption, the crux
of the ensuing argument was not whether the courts and the OCC
would be delegated the authority to determine which state laws the
preemption standard displaces. All of the House and Senate bills
distributed preemption policymaking authority relating to national
279. See Timothy R. McTaggart & Travis P. Nelson, House Passes Major Financial Services
Reform Package, FIN. SVCS. ALERT (Pepper Hamilton LLP, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 29, 2009,
at 1-2, available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/pdfs/FSAlert122909.pdf.
280. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175 (2010).
281. H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 652 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
282. W hereas the OCC preemption regulation applies to deposit and lending laws that
“obstruct, impair, or condition” the capacity of national banks to exercise their federally
created powers, Barnett Bank does not preempt state laws that merely place conditions on the
exercise of those powers. Additionally, the now-defunct OTS preemption regulation provided
for field preemption of all state deposit and lending laws. Under Barnett Bank, some such
state laws are now applicable to federal thrifts.
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banks and federal thrifts among the proposed Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (CFPB), the OCC, and the courts.  Rather, the283
crux of the argument was how best to guide the preemption dis-
cretion that was certainly going to be granted to the courts and to
the OCC. As neither the Dodd-Frank Act nor the Barnett Bank
decision define any of the key terms that constitute the Act’s sub-
stantive preemption standard, the courts and the OCC are necessar-
ily left to exercise substantial discretion in construing and applying
them.  In the end, both the House and the Senate left the preemp-284
tion delegation system that preceded the Act intact, while merely
changing the parameters of its delegations.285
B. The Dodd-Frank Act’s Institutional Choices
As important as the preemption standard adopted by the Act is
its shift of primary preemption policymaking and implementation
authority from the OCC and the OTS to the courts. The Act places
substantial procedural limitations on OCC preemption decision
making without placing similar limitations on the courts. The Act
also subjects OCC preemption decisions to far more robust judicial
review than previously deemed appropriate by the Supreme Court.
With respect to the procedural limitations placed on the OCC,
section 1044(b)(1)(B) restricts it to “case-by-case” determinations of
whether state consumer financial laws are preempted by the NBA;
the effect of an OCC preemption determination is limited to the
particular state law it is asked to consider.  In the event that the286
283. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1041-1048, 124 Stat. 1376, 2011-18
(2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Act also eliminated the OTS and
distributed its regulatory responsibility among the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OCC.
See id. §§ 312-313, 124 Stat. at 1521-23.
284. See Lemos, supra note 54, at 372.
285. That the preemption provisions, like other aspects of the Act, were subject to
substantial disagreement is further evidenced by the closeness of the ultimate votes that led
to its passage. The conference report resolving the differences between the House and Senate
versions passed the House by a vote of 237 to 192, and barely bypassed the filibuster in the
Senate by a vote of 60 to 39. H.R. 4173: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173 (last
visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
286. See § 1044(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 2015 (“[A]ny preemption determination under this
subparagraph may be made by a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller of the
Currency on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with applicable law.”); see also id. §
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OCC deems it prudent to preempt the laws of other states that are
substantially similar to the one it has specifically been asked to
consider, it must consult with the CFPB and take the CFPB’s
position into account before proceeding.  The Act imposes no such287
requirement on judicial preemption determinations.288
Beyond simply placing procedural burdens on the OCC that the
courts do not share, section 1044(b)(5)(A) and section 1044(c)
directly subordinate the OCC to the courts in the preemption pol-
icymaking hierarchy.  Section 1044(b)(5)(A) substantially reduces289
the level of deference afforded OCC preemption determinations
when those determinations are the subject of judicial review.  In290
Cuomo, the Court applied Chevron deference to the OCC’s interpre-
tation of the NBA and, as a direct consequence, to the OCC’s
preemption determination.  Section 1044(b)(5)(B) reverses that291
aspect of the case, instead directing courts reviewing any preemp-
tion determinations made by the OCC “[to] assess the validity of
such determinations, depending upon the thoroughness evident in
1044(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 2015 (defining “case-by-case basis” as “a determination pursuant
to this section made by the Comptroller concerning the impact of a particular State consumer
financial law on any national bank that is subject to that law, or the law of any other State
with substantively equivalent terms”).
287. See id. § 1044(b)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 2015.
288. Given that § 1044(b)(1)(B) separates its reference to courts and its reference to the
OCC by a comma, the fairest reading of the subsection is that courts may make preemption
determinations in accordance with applicable law, whereas the OCC must make its
preemption determinations on a case-by-case basis in accordance with applicable law. See
supra note 287. This reading is buttressed by the fact that the Senate rejected the House
version of this language, which grouped courts and the OCC together in the same clause, and
then stated that their determinations would be subject to the case-by-case limitation. See W all
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 4404(b)(1)(B)
(2009) (“Any preemption determination under this subparagraph may be made by a court or
by regulation or order of the Comptroller of the Currency in accordance with applicable law,
on a case-by-case basis.”).
289. § 1044(b)(5)(A), (c), 124 Stat. at 2015-16. 
290. Id. § 1044(b)(5)(A), 124 Stat. at 2015-16.
291. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715, 2721 (2009). In Watters,
the Court conspicuously side-stepped whether Chevron deference applied to the OCC’s
preemption determinations. See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron ’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271,
1307 & n.187 (2008) (noting that Watters was one of several cases in which the Supreme Court
reviewed agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language and either neglected to
mention Chevron, or mentioned it without supporting analysis); Ann Graham, Searching for
Chevron in Muddy W atters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations,
60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 232 (2008) (noting that Chevron analysis was “missing in action” in
Watters).
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the consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the
agency, the consistency with other valid determinations made by the
agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and
relevant to its decision.”  Stated differently, the Act downgrades292
the level of deference that courts must afford OCC preemption
determinations from Chevron to Skidmore. Even if the OCC’s
interpretations of ambiguous and potentially preemptive provisions
are reasonable—and would thus have required acceptance by the
courts under Chevron—the courts are no longer obliged to accept
them. Instead, the courts may determine the preemptive scope of
the Act and the NBA largely independent of the OCC; they need
only give consideration to the OCC’s opinion. In the event of a
disagreement, the tie now goes to the courts.
Congress did not stop at reducing the level of judicial deference
accorded to OCC preemption determinations. Section 1044(c)
further subordinates the OCC to the courts by imposing a “substan-
tial evidence” requirement for any of its preemption determina-
tions.  Two aspects of this provision are somewhat puzzling. First,293
it instructs courts to apply the “substantial evidence” test in
accordance with the Court’s decision in Barnett Bank, which did not
apply or even mention the substantial evidence test.  Second, the294
substantial evidence test, as it is commonly applied to judicial
review of administrative agency determinations,  is relevant to295
questions of fact and policy, but not to questions of law. Preemption
may conceivably, or perhaps even properly, turn on questions of
fact,  but that is not how courts currently understand it. Rather,296
292. § 1044(b)(5)(A), 124 Stat. at 2015-16.
293. Id. § 1044(c), 124 Stat. at 2016.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 266-69.
295. See, e.g., NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U .S. 292, 300 (1939)
(describing “substantial evidence” as “enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal
to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury”).
296. For instance, it may be that empirical evidence relating to the practical impact that
diverse state regulatory regimes have had on regulated industries could usefully inform
preemption analysis. Cf. Merrill, supra note 10, at 776 (asserting that Skidmore deference to
agency preemption determinations does not “channel attention to those aspects of the
preemption decision where the agency can provide the most help to the court, namely in
assessing the practical impact of diverse state rules on the objective of maintaining a single
integrated commercial market”); Sharkey, supra note 13, at 477-502 (describing an “agency
reference model” in which courts would adopt a modified Skidmore deference standard to take
advantage of the fact-finding capacities of agencies).
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courts currently understand it as purely a question of law.  Section297
1044(c)’s implications are, accordingly, an open question.  On the298
one hand, section 1044(c) may require courts to determine whether
the OCC has based its preemption determinations on demonstrable
evidence, or sufficiently compelling forecasting,  tending to show299
that state law conflicts with or poses an obstacle to federal law. If
this is the case, the section provides courts with no guidance as to
evidentiary sufficiency.  On the other hand, it is possible, though300
297. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 201 (1983) (holding the challenge to a California law ripe because “[t]he question
of pre-emption is predominantly legal, and although it would be useful to have the benefit of
California’s interpretation of what constitutes a demonstrated technology or means for the
disposal of high-level nuclear waste, resolution of the pre-emption issue need not await that
development”); Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing
that preemption is a question of law); Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 422 n.10 (7th Cir.
2002) (“[T]he issue of preemption involves a pure question of law.”); Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon
Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1473-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (observing that preemption is a question of law
reviewed de novo); United States v. R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 80 F.3d 616, 619 (1st Cir.
1996) (“[A] federal preemption ruling presents a pure question of law subject to plenary
review.”); Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Preemption
is a question of law reviewed de novo.”).
298. In a somewhat different context, Judge McGowan expressed frustration about a
similar problem relating to Congress’s requirement that the courts review for substantial
evidence rules “promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970”:
This direct review proceeding presents a classic case of what Judge Friendly has
aptly termed “a new form of uneasy partnership” between agency and court that
results whenever Congress delegates decision making of a legislative character
to the one, subject to review by the other. The angularity of this relationship is
only sharpened when, as here, Congress—with no apparent awareness of
anomaly—has explicitly combined an informal agency procedure with a standard
of review traditionally conceived of as suited to formal adjudication or
rulemaking. The federal courts, hard pressed as they are by the flood of new
tasks imposed upon them by Congress, surely have some claim to be spared
additional burdens deriving from the illogic of legislative compromise. At the
least, it would have been helpful if there had been some recognition by Congress
that the quick answer it gave to a legislative stalemate posed serious problems
for a reviewing court, and that there would inevitably have to be some latitude
accorded it to surmount those problems consistently with the legislative
purposes. The duty remains, in any event, to decide the case before us in
accordance with our statutory mandate, however dimly the rationale, if any,
underlying it can be perceived.
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 469-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citation
omitted).
299. But see id. at 472-76 (enum erating the problems associated with judicial review of
policy and predictive factual findings).
300. Again, it is unlikely that Barnett Bank can be of any assistance here, as it does not
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substantially less likely, that section 1044(c) requires courts to
determine whether the OCC has considered sufficient evidence of
Congress’s preemptive intent. If that is the case, then the implica-
tions for statutory interpretation are staggering, given the adoption
of textualist interpretive methods by several of the Justices on the
Supreme Court. It would be all but impossible under such a con-
struction for courts to ignore extratextual evidence of general
congressional intent and specific legislative history.
Regardless of whether section 1044(c) requires the OCC to point
to some factual evidence that state law conflicts or interferes with
federal law, to detailed forecasting that suggests the likelihood of
such conflicts or interference, or to some factual evidence of what
Congress actually intended by its statutory language, the implica-
tions of mandating judicial review under the substantial evidence
test are clear. Requiring the OCC to produce a record of the evi-
dence on which it relied when it made a preemption determination
would also require the onerous, costly, and time-consuming formal
rule-making or adjudication procedures  required by sections 556301
and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act.  This further, or302
perhaps completely, undermines the ability of the OCC to promul-
gate rules regarding preemption. By contrast, courts are accustomed
to conducting such proceedings, and can presumably do so much
more effectively than the OCC.
Moreover, it is possible that requiring substantial evidence review
would force the OCC to explicitly consider each of the corrective
justice, federalism, and regulatory efficiency considerations that
mention or otherwise rely on the substantial evidence test. See supra text accompanying notes
266-71.
301. See Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How To Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179,
179 n.2 (2005) (“[F]ormal rulemaking’s high costs made it an unattractive alternative for both
Congress and regulators, making its use rare.”).
302. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (2010). Requiring courts to review
agency decisions via substantial evidence affects the procedures that agencies employ when
making those decisions. See Aerial Banners, Inc. v. FAA, 547 F.3d 1257, 1261 n.3 (11th Cir.
2008) (“Substantial evidence challenges may ... be raised to formal rulemakings pursuant to
5 U.S.C. § 556-57, or to ‘agency hearings provided by statute.’”) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(2006)); Indus. Union Dep’t, 449 F.2d at 472-76 (noting that the Secretary of Labor, though
normally accustomed to promulgating rules under notice-and-comment rulemaking,
nevertheless employed a form al rule-making procedure because of substantial evidence
review).
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underlie every preemption decision,  to make plain the evidentiary303
proxies it uses to gauge the magnitude of each consideration, and to
indicate the relative importance of each to its ultimate conclusions.
Courts currently do not analyze preemption issues with such
exactitude or thoroughness.  Nor does it appear on the face of the304
Act that they would be required to do so now, though it is possible
that the burdens placed on the OCC could have some effect on how
the courts undertake the preemption inquiry in this context. In any
event, as with Congress’s elimination of the OTS,  its reduction of305
agency deference from Chevron to Skidmore, and its imposition of
the case-by-case requirement on the OCC, Congress clearly has
decided that the courts are more apt to give effect to its legislative
intentions than is the OCC and has attempted to empower the
courts accordingly.
C. Monitoring and the Centralization Default
As already described, the preemption provisions in the Dodd-
Frank Act were Congress’s attempt to rein in what was widely per-
ceived as overly aggressive preemption of state consumer financial
protection laws by the OCC and the OTS.  In trying to expand306
state autonomy in the provision of consumer financial protections,
Congress faced a choice of antipreemption strategies. It could have,
for example, specified bright-line antipreemption rules that, because
of their specificity, might not have been as comprehensive as their
sponsors wanted.  Alternatively, Congress could have opted for a307
purposivist-oriented strategy in which it enacted comparatively
broad standards, trusting that any ambiguities would be resolved
303. See Sharpe, supra note 5, at 371 (arguing that the balancing of federalism, corrective
justice, and regulatory efficiency considerations in the preemption context is a quintessential
policy decision, and is not governed by universally accepted rules of law or logic).
304. Courts frequently, and without explanation, rely heavily on one or two of these
considerations while completely ignoring the others. This is particularly true of federalism
considerations. See supra Part II.C.
305. Title III of the Dodd-Frank Act eliminates the OTS, and transfers its powers to the
OCC and the Federal Reserve. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic
Risk Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1005 n.48 (2010).
306. See supra Part III.A.
307. See supra Part III.A.
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by reference to the Act’s antipreemption legislative history.308
Congress ultimately chose the latter strategy, but did so without
due regard to either the Centralization Default or the Court’s
prevailing views on statutory interpretation.
As a general matter, the Dodd-Frank Act contains numerous
provisions intended to shift the balance of federal-state regulatory
responsibility by expanding the role of state regulators in providing
protections to consumers of financial products and services. For ex-
ample, the Act grants significant powers to state attorneys general
and state regulators to enforce provisions of the Act, regulations
promulgated under the Act, and other laws that provide remedies
to aggrieved consumers.  The Act also requires the CFPB to pro-309
pose new consumer protection rules or modifications to existing
rules at the behest of a majority of the states,  to explain its deci-310
sion not to issue a rule to each state that proposed it,  and to prom-311
ulgate rules concerning coordination of enforcement actions with
state attorneys general.  As described, the federal-state balance to312
be struck through federal preemption was, in particular, a matter
of substantial disagreement among the Obama Administration, the
House of Representatives, and the Senate.  What does not appear313
to have been a matter of substantial disagreement, however, was
the empowerment of the courts as the primary guardian of the Act’s
preemption goals.
It would have behooved those members of Congress seeking to
ensure a reduction in federal consumer financial protection pre-
emption to account for ex post monitoring considerations and the
Centralization Default. The decision in Barnett Bank, like all of the
Court’s preemption decisions that employ implied preemption
308. See supra Part II.B.1.
309. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank W all Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1042, 124 Stat. 1376, 2012 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552); id. §
1042(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2012 (permitting state attorneys general to enforce any provision of
the Act or regulations promulgated under it in any federal or state court with jurisdiction over
the defendant); id. § 1042(d)(1)-(3), 124 Stat. at 2014 (preserving state authority to adopt
rules, initiate enforcement, or take action based on state claims, state securities regulations,
or state insurance regulations).
310. Id. § 1041(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2011.
311. Id. § 1041(c)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 2012.
312. Id. § 1042(c), 124 Stat. at 2014.
313. See supra Part III.A.
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analysis, is driven in large part by the preemption default rules
adopted by the Court. It seems that Congress’s best alternative for
substantially reducing federal preemption would have been to enact
clear, targeted preemption rules. Given their well-documented
propensity for preempting state law enforced against national banks
and federal thrifts,  shifting the lion’s share of preemption policy-314
making responsibility away from the OCC and the OTS appeared to
be a logical first step in reducing the overall rate of consumer
financial protection preemption. In doing so, it also appears that
Congress failed to take account of the complex interplay between
statutory interpretation and federalism default rules that largely
drives the Supreme Court’s preemption decisions.
By all indications, the members of Congress who voted in favor of
the Dodd-Frank Act, or at least those who drafted the pertinent
preemption language, expected section 1044(b)(1)(B)’s citation to
Barnett Bank and the empowerment of the judiciary over the OCC
and the OTS to reduce the frequency with which state consumer
financial protection laws are preempted by federal law, thereby
increasing the role that states play in providing consumer financial
protections.  In codifying Barnett Bank, Congress chose, by acci-315
dent or by design, a purposivist-oriented standard that relies on a
combination of statutory text and interpretive nudging for ex post
preemption policy management.  It then left the interpretation316
and implementation tasks primarily to the courts. Congress’s choice
provides courts with substantial latitude in identifying the evi-
dence that demonstrates a conflict with or impediment to federal
prerogatives, and substantial latitude in weighing that evidence
when reaching their preemption conclusions. Concomitantly, it
provides Congress with increased opportunities to influence judicial
interpretation through manipulation of legislative history. The
Barnett Bank decision itself, authored by Justice Breyer, relied on
at least six evidentiary sources, including legislative history, to
determine the intended preemptive effect of a 1916 federal statute
permitting national banks to sell insurance in small towns.317
314. See supra Part III.A.
315. See supra Part III.B.
316. See supra Part II.A.
317. Aside from the text of the statute, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1995), and its legislative history,
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Unlike the general rule of construction that was ultimately deleted
from the Civil Rights Act of 1991,  or the guidance provided by the318
Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act of 1995,  section319
1044(b)(1)(B) does not specify the interpretive methods the courts
should employ. Rather, the section indirectly encourages courts to
rely on legislative history by declining to provide clear instructions
on how Congress wanted to resolve particular preemption issues.
Unfortunately, section 1044(b)(1)(B) does not assert any control
over the courts’ preemption preferences, nor does it exhibit any
awareness of the Centralization Default. Unlike an amendment to
the MDA’s express preemption clause introduced in the Senate,320
or the presumption against preemption,  section 1044(b)(1)(B) does321
not instruct the courts to systematically favor the preservation of
state laws and regulations. It may be that this omission was caused
by the practical and political controversy surrounding the Act’s
preemption provisions and the inescapable difficulty of foreseeing
the specific preemption problems that the Act’s provisions would
id. at 35, Justice Breyer also relied on: (1) the Court’s prior precedents interpreting similar
statutes, id.; (2) assumptions about what Congress would normally have intended in similar
situations, id. at 40-41; (3) ordinary English/common sense meanings of operative statutory
terms, id. at 38; and (4) Black’s Law Dictionary, id. Justice Breyer did not explicitly list these
sources, made no attempt to specify the weight he accorded to each of these sources, and did
not indicate whether this list of sources was exhaustive.
318. See Rodriguez, supra note 64, at 224-25.
319. UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 20(c)(4) (1995).
320. In 2009, two Senators introduced a bill to “correct the Supreme Court’s decision in
Riegel v. Medtronic, which misconstrued the intent of Congress and cut off access to our
Nation’s courts for citizens injured or killed by defective medical devices.” 155 CONG. REC.
S1861 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2007) (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy). The saving clause that the bill
would add to the MDA provides that “[n]othing in [§ 360k of the MDA] shall be construed to
modify or otherwise affect any action for damages or the liability of any person under the law
of any State.” Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, S. 540, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009). An
identical bill has also been introduced in the House of Representatives. See Medical Device
Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009). Neither bill has moved out of its
respective committee.
321. See supra Part II.C. Unlike some other of the Court’s preemption decisions, Barnett
Bank does not mention the presumption against preemption in those areas traditionally
governed by state law. See, e.g., Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated M ed. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 715 (1985) (“W here ... the field that Congress is said to have pre-empted has been
traditionally occupied by the States we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, it does
not necessarily follow that courts would apply it when construing the Dodd-Frank Act’s
preemption provisions.
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produce. Congress chose instead to leave the resolution of these
fretted preemption questions to the courts and, to a diminished ex-
tent, to the OCC. However, given the Centralization Default and the
weak ex post monitoring mechanisms at Congress’s disposal, the Act
leaves in place a likelihood of substantial policy drift. Accordingly,
the institutional choices made in the Dodd-Frank Act may not be
those best suited to achieving Congress’s preemption policy goals.
In sum, the success of Congress’s strategy will ultimately depend on
whether nudging the courts toward a purposivist interpretative
approach that permits greater ex post congressional control over
statutory meaning will also have the effect of inducing the courts to
more frequently disfavor preemption, or it will depend on whether
statutory interpretation has no meaningful impact on judicial
federalism determinations in the preemption context. If neither
supposition is correct, then Congress’s decision not to negotiate
clearer, though potentially far narrower, textualism-oriented bright-
line preemption rules, or not to reform the OCC’s and OTS’s
preemption policies while leaving their pre-enactment preemption
implementation role unchanged, will undermine its efforts to curb
preemption.
CONCLUSION
Congress cannot always choose its ideal legislative option. The
legislation it enacts is necessarily bounded by the politics of the
possible. Nevertheless, in order to reach the best possible compro-
mise, it must recognize all the critical factors that impact the
policies it seeks to elevate to the status of law. In the preemption
context, this requires Congress to have a sound understanding of
how to choose its policy implementation delegates, and how to guide
the decision making of those delegates. As this Article demon-
strates, Congress’s ability to monitor judicial and agency preemp-
tion policy implementation is a critical though frequently overlooked
factor in making the delegation choice. Additionally, understanding
that the Court has adopted a pro-preemption presumption when
addressing preemption issues is fundamental to intelligently
employing the ex post monitoring mechanisms at Congress’s
disposal. As evidenced by various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
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concerning national bank preemption, however, Congress has yet to
fully appreciate the complex interplay among legislative form,
statutory interpretation, and the Court’s Centralization Default in
preemption cases. Had it done so, it would have provided more
specific preemption instructions to the courts instead of adopting an
implied preemption standard that leaves the courts with substantial
preemption policymaking discretion.
